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WHO NEEDS ADVERSE POSSESSION?
Nadav Shoked*
Adverse possession is one of property law’s most central doctrines. Yet,
this Article contends, the need it answers has been largely misunderstood.
Adverse possession’s doctrinal effects are clear—and stark: when its
requirements are met, an owner loses her land to an invader. To explain a
doctrine instituting such a radical result, scholars resort to property law’s
major philosophical theories. These theories, they argue, at times demand
that an owner lose her land to another person who is more committed to that
land. The problem with these prevailing justifications of adverse possession,
this Article shows, is that they imagine a very specific case of adverse
possession: a squatter putting invaded land to a meaningful use. In reality,
however, very few adverse possession cases nowadays involve homesteading
squatters. Instead, most consist of neighbors bickering over the boundary
separating their lots. Thus, adverse possession now functions as a tool for
adjusting boundaries, often to the tune of a mere few inches or feet.
For this actual, as opposed to imagined, role of adverse possession,
justifications grounded in philosophical theories focused on the abstract
concept of property are not fully satisfactory. The justification for a doctrine
performing such a mundane function must be more practical. Adverse
possession must be compared, and shown to be superior, to alternative tools
that can perform the same boundary-drawing function. This Article conducts
such a comparison. It explains that American law retains adverse possession
because, contrary to popular belief, our formal system of property
boundaries—which uses map lines—is unreliable, indeed unworkable. The
choice to retain this dysfunctional boundary system, some of whose
imperfections necessitate adverse possession, is probably not socially
efficient, but it serves the interests of a powerful industry bred by the existing
system: the title insurance industry.
This Article thus supplements the somewhat inapposite philosophical
accounts of adverse possession’s function in American law with a practical
one. It then stresses the normatively troubling aspects of that function.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. This Article benefited
immensely from conversations with, and comments received from, David Dana, Nestor
Davidson, Elliot Louthen, John Lovett, Timothy Mulvaney, Christopher Odinet, David
Schwartz, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler. I am also grateful to participants at the
Property Works in Progress Conference 2020 and the faculty workshop at Northwestern.
Finally, I am very thankful to Oren Kriegel and William Siroky for outstanding assistance in
research.
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Based on this critique, this Article further advocates for judicial and
legislative reforms to better reflect and regulate adverse possession’s true
function in current American law.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of adverse possession occupies a curious spot in property law.
On the one hand, the doctrine enjoys a prominent position in both the law
school curriculum and the practice of law.1 On the other hand, scholars often
note how lacking its theoretical treatment is2 and, in almost all common-law
1. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY 293 (7th ed. 2017) (“Adverse possession
claims generate substantial litigation.”); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse
Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2420 (2001) (“The topic of adverse possession receives
prominent treatment in most property casebooks and courses. . . . [a]nd the doctrine has large
practical importance as it could be dangerous for a lawyer not to know it.”).
2. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW.
U. L. REV. 1122, 1127 (1985) (“Surprisingly, there is very little systematic discussion of
[adverse possession] in the legal literature.” (footnote omitted)); Stake, supra note 1, at 2421
(“For all its importance, this remarkable doctrine does not seem well understood, at least as
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jurisdictions outside the United States, the doctrine has been marginalized, if
not wiped out.3 How to account for this contrast: a doctrine so vital to the
thinking of property law teachers and to the work of American property
lawyers that still remains underexplained in law reviews and has vanished
from peer countries’ property systems? How could a doctrine be so central
yet so dispensable?
The contradiction, this Article argues, is rooted in a scholarly
misunderstanding of adverse possession’s role. A disconnect exists between
the functions that scholars attribute to adverse possession and the functions
that actually account for the doctrine’s vitality—or rather, its contingent
vitality—in American law. Commentators have traditionally approached
adverse possession through a philosophical lens.4 They treat the doctrine as
a window into the nature and role of the institution of property in a
democratic society.5 In reality, however, adverse possession’s role has been
primarily, if not exclusively, practical—indeed, incidental and almost
coincidental.6 On the ground, adverse possession is the outgrowth not of an
idea of property but of a specific land management system adhered to in
America and nowhere else.7 As will be seen, adverse possession probably
lacks an ideological justification but is vehemently defended in America
because it profits a specific, and powerful, industry: the title insurance
industry.8 In other words, to understand adverse possession, we need not
delve into the nature of property in a capitalist system. Instead, we must
explore the political and economic dynamics of land transactions within the
specifically American version of a capitalist system.9
Property scholars—and first-year law students—acutely feel the need to
account for adverse possession due to its extraordinary effect. Under the
doctrine, if a person actually occupies, without permission, another’s land in
a manner that is open, exclusive, and continuous for a specified period of
time, that occupier wins title to the land.10 Adverse possession is thus a
doctrine that transforms, through the passage of time, a trespasser into an
owner: it lifts title to land from its rightful owner and bestows it on an
intruder.11 The doctrine thereby contradicts the basic tenet of our property
law, indeed our capitalist regime, which is dedicated to protecting owners
property doctrines go.” (footnote omitted)); Matthew Sipe, Comment, Jagged Edges, 124
YALE L.J. 853, 853 (2014) (“Modern adverse possession doctrine appears to be in regular need
of re-justification.”).
3. See infra notes 266–71 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See Stake, supra note 1, at 2420 (“[T]he doctrine strikes at the heart of our concept of
property.”).
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See James Y. Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167,
1191–92 (2017) (criticizing scholars for not paying attention to issues of defining title).
10. See, e.g., Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 781 (Alaska 2000).
11. JOHN DWYER & PETER MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 76 (1998) (describing
adverse possession as “[p]erhaps the most startling means of acquiring property”).
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from nonowners and to empowering owners to autonomously dictate their
assets’ uses.12 Capitalism is grounded in voluntary transactions between
willing parties; adverse possession, conversely, forces an owner to part ways
with her land. Worse still, the doctrine forcefully transfers the land from its
owner, not just to any nonowner, but specifically to the nonowner who
entered the land unlawfully. Adverse possession unabashedly rewards those
ignoring property law’s commands. It favors and incentivizes thieves.13
To render this extreme result intelligible, scholars and prominent jurists,
from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Judge Richard A. Posner, explain
that the contradiction between the doctrine of adverse possession and
property law’s normative goals is merely illusory.14 The doctrine may appear
to undermine the law’s rules and priorities, but to the extent it actually does
so—as it might in a given individual case viewed in isolation—it is only in
service to the law’s overall functions and grand goals.15 Perceived within
the correct context, commentators argue, adverse possession does not subvert
the property system. Quite the opposite: adverse possession sustains the
property system.16
Two prominent theories of adverse possession exemplify this template.
One theory portrays adverse possession as critical because it affords
protection to the person who has grown attached to the land—the person
living on it—as part of property law’s general effort to protect individuals’
reliance.17 A second theory describes adverse possession as necessary
because it permits the shifting of property from those who do not use it (i.e.,
the land’s absentee owner) to those who do (i.e., the land’s actual occupier),
thereby promoting efficient use of land, as is supposedly the property
system’s goal.18 As these examples show, theorists naturally differ in the
specific normative goal they assign to property, but they contend that adverse
possession comes into play when property law’s basic rule respecting
ownership protection no longer serves that goal. True, the doctrine subverts
12. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (discussing property law’s expectations that
nonowners know not to enter, use, or take the property of an owner, thereby ensuring owner
autonomy).
13. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1,
55 (2002) (“[A]dverse possession is a legal mechanism that sanctions private takings of
property.”).
14. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of
Possession, 86 VA. L. REV. 535, 560 (2000) (“Adverse possession . . . improves rather than
challenges the system of property rights.”).
15. Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution
in Property Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47, 50 (2010) (“[T]he morality of adverse possession is not
a particularized morality, concerned with the relative deserts of the owner and squatter or the
relative merits of the uses they have for the land . . . . Rather, the morality of adverse
possession is indirectly established through the role of adverse possession in allowing property
law to serve its moral function.”).
16. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 860 (3d ed.
2000) (“If we had no doctrine of adverse possession, we should have to invent something very
like it.”).
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.B.
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property’s normal rules but only because such subversion at times becomes
normatively vital. Adverse possession steps into the breach when the
mechanical protection of property becomes detached from that protection’s
normative mission.
This account is normatively appealing and, as even this tentative
presentation of its reliance and efficiency variants shows, is logically
consistent. That logical consistency, however, hinges on a certain factual
assumption respecting how adverse possession actually operates. That
assumption is, it turns out, plainly invalid.
Arguing that adverse possession implements a compelling need to sidestep
the harsh rules of property law so as to protect the more attached, or more
efficient, user of land must envision a specific user. To be consistent, the
claims imagine an intruding user engaged in activities whose importance (to
human attachments, to economic efficiency, etc.) justifies sidestepping
property law’s dictates. The normative argument for adverse possession
descriptively conceives a possessor who, for example, occupies a house or
cultivates a farm on land that a faraway absentee owner owns. That image is
not purely sentimental.19 To a great extent, it is grounded in the history of
property law and the circumstances surrounding the original emergence of
the doctrine of adverse possession.20
In modern times, however, this quaint image has no resonance. The idea
of the squatter occupying otherwise forgotten land has little to do with
adverse possession’s realities in 2021.21 Casebook staples in the field
notwithstanding—and those staples are, it should be noted, mostly cases

19. John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL
L. REV. 816, 826 (1994) (explaining that the law’s assumptions “apply neatly to the classic
case—adverse possession of a developed parcel, such as land improved with a house or farm—
upon which the limitations model was premised in agricultural England”).
20. The doctrine’s emergence reflects the original common law that did not separate
possession from ownership and that did not require documents for land transfers but rather
completed transactions through occupation of land. See 5 GEORGE THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES
ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 573–74 (1979). Ownership was not based on the
modern concept of title, but on actual possession (“seisin”). See id.
21. An analysis of all reported state court decisions from 2019—identified through a
Westlaw search—found eighty-seven adverse possession of land cases. Only one arguably
involved a squatter. Philadelphia v. Galdo, 217 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2019). There, a neighbor
expanded his possession of his own land to also include an adjoining city-owned vacant lot.
Id. at 813–14. Even ignoring this factual caveat, the case’s doctrinal relevance here is
somewhat questionable because adverse possession claims against governments have
traditionally constituted a separate body of law. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 168–
69 (5th ed. 2016). Of the remaining eighty-six adverse possession cases, one was a “color of
title” case. See Chapman v. Settles, 265 So. 3d 866 (La. Ct. App. 2019). On color of title, see
infra Part III.A.3. Two cases involved failed claims under specific state statutes setting
foreclosure procedures. US Bank Tr., N.A. ex rel. LSF8 Master Tr. v. Trimble, 296 So.3d 867,
869 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019); Herrmann v. Bank of Am., N.A., 97 N.Y.S. 344, 347–48 (App.
Div. 2019). One involved a dispute between co-owners. Hodge v. Wright, 435 P.3d 126, 130
(Okla. Civ. App. 2019). One was a family dispute. Scott v. Hicks, 567 S.W.3d 266, 272 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2019). And one combined a family inheritance dispute with a boundary dispute.
Hammond v. Hammond, 438 P.3d 408 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). All other cases involved pure
boundary disputes, as did the three reported federal adverse possession decisions.
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distinguished by their remoteness in time or place22—the prototypical current
adverse possession controversy follows a different, and much less stirring,
factual pattern. Standard adverse possession cases nowadays involve
disputes over fences intruding on a neighbor’s land,23 bushes or trees
mistakenly planted beyond the property’s border,24 driveways that cross the
property line,25 and the like. Boundary disputes, rather than the standing of
squatters or homesteaders, form the realm of adverse possession in
contemporary American law.26
And for boundary disputes, the normative justifications for adverse
possession’s treatment of squatters and homesteaders are inadequate, if not
wholly irrelevant. Asserting that protecting the intruder is crucial for
assuring meaningful attachments or efficient land uses is somewhat farfetched when the intrusion consists of a few feet—or inches—of a fence,
garden, or path. Providing the planter of a tomato bush27 or the leveler of a
driveway28 ownership of those few feet or inches of land—at the expense of
the tract’s true owner—does not clearly and forcefully promote meaningful
human attachments or efficient land uses. Standing alone, the plight of the
tomato planter or driveway leveler does not justify disturbing settled
principles of property ownership protection. The maintenance of a stray
tomato bush or a driveway’s few inches could hardly be said to give voice to
property’s essence in our capitalist system. The legal system’s choice to
protect these intrusions through adverse possession thus cannot easily be
justified through appeals to property philosophy.
Because adverse possession in practice is concerned not with
accommodating squatters but with settling boundary disputes, it must be
justified as a mechanism performing that very specific function—rather than
any grand philosophical assignment. Property law’s reliance on adverse
possession is warranted only to the extent that, as a practical matter, adverse
possession is an effective tool for policing borders.
Until now, commentators normatively assessing adverse possession,
preoccupied with abstract philosophies of property, have largely failed to
fully compare adverse possession to other mechanisms that carry out the

22. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 150 (8th ed. 2017) (using Van
Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952)); SHELDON F. KURTZ ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 196 (6th ed. 2012) (using Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52
Va. (11 Gratt.) 172 (1854)); SINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 299 (using Nome 2000 v.
Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990)).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489, 492 (W. Va. 1996).
24. See, e.g., Chuckta v. Asija, 903 A.2d 243, 244 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (forsythia
bushes); Lewis v. Aslesen, 635 N.W.2d 744, 745 (S.D. 2001) (trees).
25. See, e.g., Trokey v. R.D.P. Dev. Grp., LLC, 401 S.W.3d 516, 520–21 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013).
26. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 90 (5th ed. 1998) (observing that
boundary cases are the majority of adverse possession cases); SINGER, supra note 21, at 164
(“Most disputes covered by the law of adverse possession are border disputes.”).
27. Spangler v. Schaus, 264 A.2d 161, 165 (R.I. 1970).
28. Trokey, 401 S.W.3d at 523.
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same function of boundary setting.29 But only a comparison of this kind
could validate adverse possession’s alleged worth and necessity.30 This
Article engages in such a comparison and finds adverse possession lacking.
To conduct such a comparison, this Article turns our attention back to
property law’s basic task—defining and protecting rights in land31—and
examines the most straightforward system the law can employ to define
land’s boundaries: reliance on formal property lines. The system of formal
property boundary lines is a structure necessary for all transactions.32
Individuals would be unable to buy and sell land if no agreed-on system for
delineating property’s borders—the contours of the land traded—existed.33
A boundary-setting and -tracking system is thus a common, indispensable
resource. Yet it is not costless. Maintaining the mapping system and
assuring that all transactions accurately reflect it requires expenditures. The
state can dedicate the funds necessary for these tasks, thereby providing
owners with a reliable formal boundary system.34 Alternatively, the system
can be left to the private market, where private owners, through individual
transactions, manage it.35
To economize their own costs, the American states have opted for the
private option.36 But once a state makes this choice, the resultant system will
inevitably suffer from certain inaccuracies. For example, because no central
authority dictates a common vocabulary or mandates consistent descriptions,
disparate transactions can contradict each other in their descriptions of the
same lot. The deed for Lot A will place its boundary with Lot B at one spot,
while the deed for Lot B will place the same boundary with Lot A at another
spot.37 One deed selling Lot A will identify one boundary, while a later deed
for that same lot A will designate another.38
Adverse possession is the law’s means to contend with such mistakes.
Adverse possession is striking to most observers due to its blunt rejection—
29. See, e.g., Michael V. Hernandez, Restating Implied, Prescriptive, and Statutory
Easements, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75, 106–08 (2005) (contending that prescription is
unjust toward the owner while assuming that simple and full reliance on the public record for
determining property rights would be possible in the doctrine’s absence); Merrill, supra note
2, at 1129–30 (assuming that adverse possession is an efficient way to manage such disputes).
30. The adverse possession literature sometimes simply assumes that the formal system
is effective and adverse possession is therefore the element introducing uncertainty. See, e.g.,
Stake, supra note 1, at 2439 (“Compared with the rules of title transfer, which determine
record title primarily from documents that remain reliable for many years, the elements of
adverse possession are indeterminate.”).
31. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
32. See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2008) (arguing that property is about regulating search
costs in an efficient manner).
33. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (1982).
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See, e.g., Harris v. Walden, 333 S.E.2d 254, 257–58 (N.C. 1985).
38. See, e.g., Macallister v. DeStefano, 463 N.E.2d 346, 349–50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
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indeed, overruling—of legal property lines.39 But the truth is that in America
there are no real formal property lines because the law adopted a private
option for boundaries’ management. Adverse possession serves as the law’s
acknowledgment that that private option is inherently imperfect. Adverse
possession treats that imperfection, but it does not, and does not portend to,
treat it perfectly. It cannot fully replace a comprehensive (but expensive)
public system in providing certainty to market actors. Adverse possession
does not solve all mistaken boundaries cases—for example, it only deals with
long-standing mistakes.40 Furthermore, its very existence adds more
uncertainty to the system.41 A buyer purchases land under the risk that the
boundary of the purchased tract is not as it seems or that it might shift over
time: a neighbor might have gained, or might later gain, some of the
purchased land through adverse possession.
The risks that the absence of a formal public system creates, and buyers’
desire to mitigate them, generate a demand for a market product.42 Buyers
in a property world that lacks a strong public system of boundary
management wish for some assurances. As with other risks individuals
would rather not bear, like those of fire or accident, the market provides that
assurance through insurance. For a price, a title insurance company will
assume on the buyer’s behalf the risk of mistakes in the description of a
property or the rights therein.
While American lawmakers’ decision to retain this mostly private system
of property boundary management could have been based on an informed
assessment of the relative social benefits and costs of each system,43 this
Article’s analysis concludes otherwise. Drawing on the literature on interest
group dynamics and surveying land registration and adverse possession
practices in other common-law systems, this Article finds that title insurance
companies are the culprits behind America’s dedication to its inefficient
private boundary system. For their industry’s survival, these entities are
heavily interested in the absence of a reliable formal system for managing
boundaries. That system, in turn, demands that the law retain adverse
possession.44 Adverse possession is one price, alongside payment of
insurance premiums, that the general public—all landowners in America—
pays to subsidize the title insurance companies.45 Alas, brute interest group
dynamics, rather than high-minded ideals regarding property’s goals, are
responsible for adverse possession’s remarkable endurance.
39. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
40. Comment, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE
L.J. 1245, 1256 (1959) (“Statutory provisions barring actionable claims not asserted within a
specified time contribute little to improving the saleability of land.”).
41. See CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 101, 106 (1961) (noting the
possibility that adverse possession doctrines can introduce, as well as resolve, uncertainty).
42. See infra Part II.C.
43. See infra Part II.D.
44. This holds whether or not the specific policies title insurance companies issue cover
adverse possession. The companies do not need adverse possession—they need the weak
formal boundary system, which, in turn, needs adverse possession.
45. See infra Part II.E.
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This conclusion is not merely of theoretical import. Beyond explaining
adverse possession’s current role better than traditional justifications, it also
performs important prescriptive functions. Adverse possession’s nature as
an imperfect mechanism for settling boundary disputes should affect judges’
attitudes toward three of the doctrine’s legal elements. The doctrine’s true,
and decidedly practical, function in our contemporary land system should
guide the interpretation of the tests applied to discern whether two of the
doctrine’s most contested conditions for awarding land to the intruder—
hostility and notoriety—have been satisfied in a given case. It should also
impact the treatment of a special category of cases known as “color of title”
cases. Additionally, this Article’s findings respecting adverse possession’s
true function should engender legislative reforms. They suggest that the
mechanisms used for drawing property boundaries should be perceived as a
“public utility”: a vital natural monopoly, not dissimilar to traditional
services legally characterized as utilities, such as electricity or railroads.46.
The title insurance market must accordingly be made subject to a certain form
of administrative regulation, inspired by the same regulation that governs
utilities.47
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the traditional
explanations for adverse possession and highlights their shortcomings.
Building on these criticisms of the existing accounts, Part II suggests that
adverse possession’s true function is to settle the boundary disputes that are
inevitable in our land system. For this purpose, this part presents the
competing regimes that can manage land transactions, identifies the
American regime’s flaws, and explains why those flaws generate the need
for adverse possession. Part II also assesses the reasons why American law
adheres to an inherently flawed system necessitating adverse possession. It
establishes that adverse possession is necessary to our land management
system due to states’ inability to move toward a centralized system—a move
that would require overcoming title insurance companies’ resistance. Part III
considers prescriptive ramifications of this finding. It recommends better
ways of understanding and interpreting different elements of adverse
possession doctrine. It also suggests a framework for regulating the title
insurance industry.
I. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION AND THEIR LIMITS
A landowner has the basic power to exclude.48 She has the legal power to
decide who may enter her land.49 If some individual enters that land without
such permission, that individual is deemed a trespasser.50 Because trespass
46. See infra Part III.B.
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (2000) (“[T]he right to property is a
right to exclude others from things . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
49. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997) (accepting that
the continued plowing of land, despite the owners’ protests, was intentional trespass).
50. See, e.g., Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998).
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is a tort,51 the owner can petition a court for an injunction ordering the
intruder’s removal.
If the trespasser meets the requirements of adverse possession, however,
that trespasser cannot be removed.52 To establish such an adverse possession
claim, the trespasser must show that she: (1) actually possessed the land, (2)
in an open and notorious manner, (3) exclusively, (4) adversely to the
owner’s interests, and (5) continuously for a number of years the statute
details.53 The time period that the different states institute ranges from five
to forty years.54 States sometimes modify these requirements or add further
ones,55 but they do not alter adverse possession’s essence: adverse
possession is an exception to trespass.
As a defense to a trespass claim, adverse possession is readily explicable.
It reflects an application to the property context of the general statute of
limitations rule, which bars claims brought too long after the occurrence of
the facts giving rise to those claims.56 Good reasons justify such a temporal
block on trespass claims, as on all other legal claims. Retaining evidence
becomes difficult as time passes;57 a defendant comes to assume that the
claim will not be brought (and thus, for example, refrains from keeping
financial reserves for a payout);58 and courts should not concern themselves
with claims that the parties themselves have neglected.59
These are all good reasons to shield an intruder from a delayed trespass
claim, but adverse possession goes further. Adverse possession not only
prevents a trespasser from being removed, it actually transfers ownership of
the intruded land to her.60 If the requirements detailed above are met, the
trespasser becomes the land’s owner at the expense of its real, or title, owner.
Indeed, she might proceed herself to bring a trespass claim against the owner
if the owner ever attempts to reenter the land.61 This remarkable result of a

51. See, e.g., Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).
52. SINGER, supra note 21, at 43.
53. See Apperson v. White, 950 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
54. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 87.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 2019).
55. Some states, for example, require the possessor to pay taxes. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3221-7-1 (2021).
56. See, e.g., Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 394 A.2d 299, 302 (Md. 1978) (noting
that “the adoption of statutes of limitations reflect[s] a policy decision regarding what
constitutes an ‘adequate period of time’ for ‘a person of ordinary diligence’ to pursue his
claim” (quoting Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 378 A.2d 1100, 1104 (Md. 1977))).
57. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (noting that statutes of limitation
“protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth
may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of
witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise”).
58. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)
(discussing the limiting role that statutes of limitations play on the enforcement of statutory
versus common law actions to recover wages).
59. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“[T]he courts ought to be
relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.”).
60. See 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 87.03.
61. Id.
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successful adverse possession claim defies easy explanation.62 Special
rationales—not the mere procedural grounds provided for the statute of
limitations’ usual operation as a defense to a claim—must back this
extraordinary effect.63
Starting in the late nineteenth century, jurists have attempted to uncover
these rationales.64 In the ensuing decades, several explanations have been
developed and refined. Here, this Article groups them into three categories:
reliance, efficiency, and quieting title.65 It relies on this tripartite scheme for
convenience alone. Certain explanations might fall into more than one of the
categories, disparate explanations might operate in tandem, and other,
perhaps better, categorization schemes are imaginable. This part’s goal,
however, is not to promote a specific ordering scheme for adverse
possession’s justifications. Rather, it is to present the disparate explanations
the literature offers for adverse possession and to detect their weaknesses—
and, where present, strengths—so as to construct a better account in Part II.
A. Adverse Possession as Protecting Reliance
“The true explanation of title by prescription seems to me to be that man,
like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings,
and when the roots have grown to a certain size, can’t be displaced without
cutting at his life.”66 Oliver Wendell Holmes’s statement is probably the
most famous sentence written to explain adverse possession in America.67 It
gives voice to a notion in line with common intuition, whereby at its heart,
adverse possession is a tool set to maintain the important relationship a
person develops over time with the land on which she finds herself. The idea
has retained resonance in legal and scholarly discussions about adverse
possession.68 Naturally, over the intervening years since Holmes wrote his
vaunted lines, the study of property law has greatly evolved, and many new
62. Adverse possession is unique in this effect among the defenses to trespass. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (establishing a right of entry under public accommodation laws); United
States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1991) (analyzing the effects of claimants’ necessity
defense).
63. In most states, the statute of limitations merely limits the ability to bring an action for
recovery of possession, as it does with respect to all torts. Courts then made the added move
to actually transform the possessor into the owner through judicial doctrine. See 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES § 15.2 (A.
James Casner ed., 1952). In a few states, the statutes themselves are couched in terms
indicating that the occupant acquires title through their operation. See id. § 15.2, at 761.
64. For the literature’s history generally, see John Lovett, Disseisin, Doubt, and Debate:
Adverse Possession Scholarship in the United States (1881–1986), 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1
(2017).
65. For a similar breakdown, see Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for
“Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1059–63 (2006).
66. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907), in THE MIND
AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 417,
417–18 (Max Lerner ed., 1946).
67. See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 64, at 14 n.73; Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131; Stake, supra
note 1, at 2419.
68. See, e.g., Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1988) (“We
believe that Justice Holmes’ view of adverse possession represents sound public policy.”).
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sophisticated theories have emerged. Several of these still draw on Holmes’s
original insight when approaching adverse possession.69 They have
developed Holmes’s insight further and provided it with stronger normative
backing by situating it within currently prevalent understandings of property
as an institution invested in the protection of individuals’ personhood or of
social reliance interests.
One influential rereading of the roots idea of adverse possession integrated
it into a personhood theory of property.70 Under the personhood theory of
property, the law affords varying protections to different properties in
accordance with the given property’s importance to its owner’s life.71 Some
assets—a home, a family heirloom—are deeply embedded in an individual’s
personhood. Other assets—money, stock—are not part of the individual’s
personality; they are only held for their market value and are hence fungible.
The law protects personhood properties more forcefully than fungible ones:
the latter are, by definition, replaceable, while the former are specifically
necessary for maintaining one’s personality.72
This theory of property can readily account for adverse possession by
echoing Holmes’s old insight. The adverse possessor has been on the land
for a lengthy period of time; that land has become part of her life.73 For her,
the property is now a personhood property.74 The original owner, on the
other hand, has not been on the land. Worse still, she has been ignoring it—
she was not even aware someone else was using it. Just as over time the land
has come to form part of the possessor’s personality, it has become fully
fungible for the owner.75 Hence the law, via adverse possession, prioritizes
the interests of the possessor, who holds the personhood interest in the land,
over those of the owner, who now holds a mere fungible interest.76
Personhood theory adherents thereby situate adverse possession’s roots
explanation within a property theory focused on individual rights.
The roots explanation, first introduced by Holmes, also fits into a less
individualistic, more socially oriented, property theory. Over the past two
decades, such social theories have proliferated.77 They go by different
names, but collectively, they can be referred to as progressive property

69. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131–32 (finding four modern variants of Holmes’s insight).
70. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982).
71. Id. at 987.
72. Id. at 978–79.
73. See Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739,
741–42, 748 (1986).
74. Id. at 748.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1616 (2008); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
821, 863–65 (2009); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A
Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1237–38 (2005). See generally
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003).
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theories.78 They theorize that property’s function is to promote human
flourishing, and flourishing consists of much more than mere individual
entitlements.79 Relationships with others are also vital for human
flourishing.80 Furthermore, because property law aims to enable all society
members to flourish, it might sometimes force an owner to relinquish some
of her powers to accommodate other individuals’ needs. Property ownership
thus encompasses not only individual rights but also obligations toward
others.81
For progressive theories, adverse possession illustrates this social and
obligation-oriented nature of property. The doctrine highlights the fact that
property focuses on protecting an individual’s reliance on her surroundings
as necessary for human flourishing.82 The possessor, who has been on the
land, relies on the persistence of her relationship with that land.83 She builds
her life and social relationships there and becomes attached to the
surrounding community. The owner, for her part, should be subject to an
obligation of allowing the possessor to maintain that attachment and
community, especially because her past behavior—when she, the owner, did
not intervene with the possessor’s stay—permitted that attachment to
strengthen.84 It would be unfair toward others to permit the owner to step in
and attempt to unravel these communal connections.85
Viewed as necessary for protecting a personal attachment to land (under
personhood theories) or a social attachment to a community (under
progressive theories), the reliance-based explanation of adverse possession
does more than merely justify the doctrine. It asserts that without adverse
possession, property law cannot, in certain circumstances, live up to its
promise of fortifying individuals’ relationships and the stability of
communities.86 The reliance-based explanations thus transform the doctrine
from an aberration in property law demanding an excuse into a key element
of the law, exemplifying its overall goals.
Unfortunately, while adverse possession theoretically secures attachments
and relationships—and thus can draw from the reliance justification—in
reality, it hardly ever does. The reliance justification’s adherents themselves
have admitted a certain such disconnect. Specifically, they note the difficulty
78. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 743, 743 (2009).
79. See id. at 743–44.
80. See id.
81. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
82. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 611 (1988).
83. Id. at 666–67.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. On the centrality of community stability to relational property theories and the
resultant need for the law to assure residents the ability to stay in their communities, see, for
example, Nadav Shoked, The Community Aspect of Private Ownership, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
759, 803–05 (2011).
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presented by the fact that adverse possession awards ownership not only to
individual invaders but also to invading entities such as corporations.87
Personhood and progressive property theories center on human beings; a
corporation does not have much of a personhood interest, and its flourishing
is not empathically embraced by progressive scholars.
This one
inconsistency can perhaps be written off as an inevitable, and maybe
worthwhile, cost of adopting a doctrine necessary for human flourishing in a
legal system that mostly does not distinguish humans from corporations.88
Still, even if not debilitating in and of itself, this inconsistency is
symptomatic of the reliance account’s more general and unacknowledged
removal from the doctrine’s actual operation.
While in the abstract, adverse possession can be viewed as invested in
protecting reliance interests important for personhood or human flourishing,
the doctrine’s real-world application no longer performs that function. This
section’s review explained that personhood accounts view adverse
possession as protecting a person from losing her home or farm; progressive
accounts view adverse possession as keeping a person in her community.
That means, however, that these accounts are all afflicted by the flaw noted
in the introduction to this Article: almost all modern adverse possession
cases are not about keeping a possessor in her home or community.89 They
are about granting a neighbor a few extra feet (or inches) of land located at
the margins of her property.90
For boundary disputes, concepts of roots or reliance are inescapably
tenuous.91 An individual’s loss of a few feet of land when a boundary is
adjusted does not displace her roots. Even if the intruder must remove a few
bushes she planted or a driveway she paved, a major unsettling of her reliance
is unlikely.92 If an intruder endures a loss in a boundary dispute, she is not
forced to leave her house or community. Consequently, neither the
personhood nor the progressive variants of the roots account can justify the
need to expand protection through adverse possession to the intruding
possessor in such disputes.
The reliance rationale has distinguished provenance and finds further
support in some of the most influential contemporary property theories.93 It
could explain the archetypal adverse possession case of yore and, in the
process, effectively shed light on property law’s goals in a democratic
87. SINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 309; Radin, supra note 73, at 749.
88. See, e.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 259 (1898) (citing County of Santa Clara
v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)) (clarifying that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies equally to corporations).
89. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
90. Id.
91. David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60 B.C. L. REV. 753, 757 (2019)
(explaining that the importance of the owner’s interests, and thus the extent of their legal
protection, diminishes as one gets closer to the property’s boundary).
92. The law recognizes other doctrines protecting the intruder in those extraordinary
circumstances involving major reliance interests. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
93. Another modern interpretation of Holmes’s claim connects it to the literature on the
endowment effect. See Stake, supra note 1, at 2459–63.
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society. Despite these theoretical merits, however, the reliance account does
little to justify adverse possession as it operates in modern form.
Accomplishing that mission requires an explanation that does not apply
exclusively to the (today, mostly irrelevant) case of a squatter’s protection.
B. Adverse Possession as Promoting Efficiency
While personhood and progressive theories advocate protecting property
when property is put to certain uses, efficiency theories of property are
agnostic with regard to the specific uses to which property must be
dedicated.94 Hence, they might more successfully account for adverse
possession’s current function. Efficiency-minded commentators argue that
society recognizes and protects legal institutions, such as property, not due
to a commitment to some objective judgment respecting desirable behaviors
or uses but rather because these institutions increase overall social utility.95
Applied to property, this framework proclaims that the law’s goal is to assure
the most valuable uses of land.96 Individuals are awarded ownership over
land because an individual’s decision regarding her asset’s use is much
likelier to maximize its value than a decision another makes.97 If one
individual is deemed an asset’s owner, she reaps the benefits of a wise
decision respecting its use. Correspondingly, she pays the costs of an unwise
decision. She thus has an incentive—that others do not have—to make the
best decisions for the asset. Furthermore, as the person closest to the asset,
she knows best its conditions and potential.98 For these reasons, private
decision-making over assets’ use and transfer is deemed superior to common
holding or state control.99
Adverse possession, of course, diverges from this baseline: it deprives the
individual owner of the power to determine her land’s uses. Still, efficiencyminded commentators have endeavored to justify adverse possession as
promoting property’s overall goal of assuring efficient land use.100 Adverse
possession does so, the argument goes, by moving an asset from an individual
who does not value it much to another who values it more.101
As noted, to win an adverse possession claim, an individual must actually
possess the land.102 She must possess it exclusively—that is, while the owner
herself is not possessing the land.103 Furthermore, she must possess it
undisturbed by the owner for a lengthy period of time. That the possessor is
94. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 79 (1988).
95. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 26, at 11–12.
96. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
348 (1967).
97. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
98. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754–55
(2004).
99. Id.
100. Dr. Karl T. Muth & Ashley D. Cox, Adverse Possession: A Modern Perspective, 47
REAL EST. L.J. 6, 15–16 (2018).
101. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 154 (6th ed. 2012).
102. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
103. Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1990).
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on the land for a long while, as the owner ignores her (and the land), indicates
that the possessor values the land much more than the owner.104 Therefore,
from an efficiency perspective, it is better if the possessor controls the
land.105 Adverse possession assures this desired result by lifting ownership
from the owner—who has been “sleeping” on the land106—and granting it to
the possessor—who values and uses it.107
This efficiency case for adverse possession might appear rather
simplistic.108 It makes two assumptions that must be established or explained
away: one pertaining to the parties’ respective valuations of the land and a
second pertaining to the infeasibility of a market transaction between the
parties.
First, the idea that the adverse possessor inherently and necessarily values
the land more than its owner is not obvious. To satisfy an adverse possession
claim’s elements, the possessor need not improve the land, just possess it.
No structures need be built; permanent, or even temporary, habitation need
not be established.109 The quintessential evidence for possession—
fencing110—does not automatically entail any work on, or betterment of, the
enclosed area.111 Conversely, the fact that the title owner has been “sleeping
on” (ignoring) the land does not always imply that she is undervaluing or
underutilizing it.112 Active use is not always a land’s best use: preservation
is a socially and economically valuable use.113 Even in traditional

104. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 80 (1987).
105. JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 144 (2006).
106. Originally the law was probably much more concerned with the demerits of the owner
who was ignoring the title than it was with the possessor’s merits. See JAMES BARR AMES,
Lectures XVII. The Nature of Ownership (1909), reprinted in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY
AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 192, 197 (1913).
107. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 526, 539–40 (1996) (observing that adverse possession was “adjusted for
wilderness land in a manner that tended to vest title in the industrious user rather than the idle
claimant”).
108. Fennell, supra note 65, at 1064 (“The dual notion of punishing a ‘sleeping owner’ and
rewarding a ‘working possessor’ sometimes makes an appearance in discussions of adverse
possession—but often as a straw man worthy of ridicule. The reasons for scorn are clear
enough.”).
109. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990) (“Whether a claimant’s
physical acts upon the land are sufficient[] . . . does not necessarily depend on the existence
of significant improvements, substantial activity or absolute exclusivity.”).
110. Ofuasia v. Smurr, 392 P.3d 1148, 1155 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (“Fences are typical
expressions of hostility . . . . The existence of a fence may be dispositive evidence of hostile
possession.”).
111. Similarly, to avoid losing land through adverse possession, the title owner need not
actively use, let alone develop, it. She solely needs to verify, before the period of limitations
passes, that no trespasser is on the land. If a trespasser is found, she need only evict that
trespasser or grant her permission to stay.
112. See, e.g., Jeffry M. Netter et al., An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes,
6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 219 (1986) (observing that “optimizing behavior does not
require that land be continuously in service”).
113. See Sprankling, supra note 19 (suggesting that the idea is out of step with modern
policy, as sometimes less intensive uses are best for society); Stake, supra note 1, at 2434–35
(same).
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developmental terms, sometimes land is best kept underdeveloped.114 This
allows for the management of land supply, which increases values in the long
term, prevents real estate bubbles, leaves land available for development
patterns that might become popular later, and so on.115
These observations require refining the efficiency justification as
presented above. An intruder’s lengthy possession of land does not
necessarily imply that the owner values the land less than her, but it probably
provides a strong indicator.116 It serves as a proxy; by no means a perfect
proxy but a proxy nonetheless.117 An imperfect proxy inevitably generates
risks of mistake: relying on this proxy, adverse possession might end up
awarding land to a possessor who in fact values the land less than its owner.
Still, the law tolerates this risk due to land’s unique nature as an asset. Unlike
most other assets, land is a limited resource.118 The law thus places a special
premium on not seeing land go to waste.119 Adverse possession staves off
such waste by neglectful owners, and for that reason, society finds acceptable
the risk of mistake the doctrine introduces.120 Adverse possession does not
assure that land is used in the most valuable way, but it increases the
likelihood of that eventuality; given that eventuality’s importance, the
increase in its likelihood is worthwhile—despite potential costs.121
Aside from assuming that the possessor uses the land better than its owner,
the efficiency account of adverse possession must make a second
assumption, which pertains to the impossibility of a deal between those
parties. Why is adverse possession needed to shift the land to its more
effective user to begin with? Under economic analysis’s own terms, for the
desirable transfer of an asset to its better user, no external intervention is
needed. The individual who values an asset more than its current owner will
pay more money for it than what the current owner demands.122 Hence, a
114. See Netter et al., supra note 112.
115. See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Running Out: The Problem of Exhaustible Resources,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 181–85 (1978).
116. Merrill puts it somewhat differently, explaining that while the owner is only required
to monitor the land, he is thereby forced to assert his right to exclude and therefore “is in effect
being asked to ‘flush out’ offers to purchase his property, to make a market in the land.”
Merrill, supra note 2, at 1130.
117. EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 128–29 (2010).
118. Edward H. Rabin, Zoning and Other Matters, 24 STAN. L. REV. 426, 428 (1972)
(reviewing DONALD G. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
(1971)).
119. See generally Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A
Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006).
120. See Katz, supra note 15, at 63–64 (arguing that an owner who fails to set the agenda
for his land and make others conform to it deserves to lose title since, as an institution,
property’s goal is to have someone set an agenda for the asset).
121. Furthermore, if courts are aware of this goal and the risks of the doctrine, they can
reduce the risks of mistake by adjusting the doctrinal tests they use. See, e.g., Fennell, supra
note 65, at 1066–67; Donald C. Morgan, Comment, Balancing Interests: How the Prescriptive
Easement Doctrine Can Continue to Efficiently Support Public Policy, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1253, 1267 (2015).
122. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3–4 (1960).
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transaction will be accomplished. It follows that if a possessor indeed values
land more than its title owner, the former will simply purchase it from the
latter. If such a deal does not materialize, then the possessor does not truly
value the land more. The forced transfer of the land in such circumstances
to that possessor through adverse possession decreases utility as it ignores
the parties’ bargaining preferences, which reflect their true valuations.123
The only way to maintain that the forced deal might still increase utility is
to presume that the voluntary deal between the owner and the possessor does
not materialize, not because the two parties do not desire it but due to some
other, external reason.124 The assumption is that the deal would be
efficient—the possessor does value the land more than the owner—but is
blocked on account of “transaction costs.”125 Reaching a deal, any deal,
always involves bargaining, and bargaining is not costless. A buyer might
desire to buy but cannot find the seller,126 she might value the asset more
than its holder but has no way of learning or transmitting that fact,127 or she
might need intermediaries to draft an agreement.128 Such transaction costs
often preclude the consummation of a deal that would benefit both parties.
In such cases of market failure, the law must facilitate the efficient deal. It
might even have to force the deal. Read in these terms, adverse possession
is a legal intervention necessary to achieve an efficiency-enhancing transfer
that the market cannot autonomously produce.129
The challenge for the efficiency argument is to identify those transaction
costs that supposedly block the efficient market deal. Why is it prohibitively
expensive for the owner who does not value the land, and the possessor who
does, to transact? One answer is that the owner might be tempted to extort
the possessor, thereby making the deal artificially unappealing and hindering
it.130 Knowing that the possessor has already invested in the land, as she has
been on it for years, the owner could demand an exorbitant price that does
not accurately reflect her valuation of the land131 and which the possessor
cannot afford.132
This claim is not without its limitations.133 Criticism grows even more
compelling when considering the reality this Article highlights, whereby
123. Fennell, supra note 65, at 1064.
124. Muth & Cox, supra note 100, at 15–16.
125. See Sterk, supra note 104, at 81.
126. Stake, supra note 1, at 2443 (explaining that adverse possession is a solution to the
problem of the missing seller).
127. Sterk, supra note 104, at 72.
128. For example, she might simply lack the liquid resources to express her valuation in
terms of willingness to pay. Jack M. Beerman & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions
in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 964–65 (1989).
129. See Netter et al., supra note 112, at 220.
130. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics
of Injunctive and Damages Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1092–93 (1980) (recognizing
this risk).
131. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131 (noting how, because the possessor has “sunk costs” in
the land, the owner can extract “quasi-rents” from her).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1132.
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most adverse possession cases involve boundary disputes. The supposition
that an owner can draw on extraordinary market power to abuse the possessor
is far from evident.134 First, the power might be mutual: just as the owner is
the only potential seller the possessor can deal with, the possessor might be
the sole buyer the owner can approach. This actuality is almost inevitable in
boundary disputes.135 Second, the notion that the owner can safely assume
that the possessor cannot walk away from the land—and is thus susceptible
to extortion—ignores the fact that the possessor’s sunk investments might be
negligible. As noted, adverse possession does not require the possessor to
improve the land. Hence, the possessor’s acts on it might amount to no more
than erecting a fence, planting a bush, or removing debris.136 Such
investments are rarely priceless: the possessor’s fear of losing them is
unlikely to embolden an owner to make exorbitant demands.
True, a case could be imagined of an owner silently observing an intruder
constructing major improvements for years and then popping up demanding
payment.137 In such a case, the demand could indeed be extortionate and
unreflective of the land’s true value to either party, thereby derailing a
mutually beneficial deal. Such circumstances could perhaps materialize in
an extreme case of a boundary dispute: a neighbor might mistakenly build a
small part—perhaps no more than a few inches—of her house’s foundation
or of one of its walls on the owner’s land. To remove the intruding
foundation or wall, the neighbor would have to demolish her entire house,
and thus the owner enjoys an awesome power in negotiating with the
neighbor. But, property law already renders this eventuality almost
impossible. Several doctrines—improving trespasser, relative hardship, and
unjust enrichment—preclude the owner from procuring an injunction to have
such intruding buildings removed.138 Consequently, in the most easily
imaginable circumstances of a rather hard-to-imagine scenario of the
scheming owner, the law already thwarts the owner’s efforts to extract
outrageous rents from the possessor.139
Perhaps a case could still somehow crop up where adverse possession
would be the only way to avoid an asking price’s unreasonable inflation.140
But the need to resort to extreme and unlikely sets of hypothetical facts only
highlights the difficulty in pinpointing the transaction costs allegedly barring

134. Even the claim that an actor’s market power is a transaction cost is contested. See Lee
Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1481 (2013).
135. The same probably applies to nonboundary cases, too. Because the owner has not
acted with respect to the relevant land for a lengthy period of time, little reason exists to
assume that it is generating much market interest.
136. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131; Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, An
Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 164 (1995).
138. See SINGER, supra note 21, at 169–70.
139. Fennell, supra note 65, at 1060–61 (detailing the legal tools rendering impossible such
extortion of possessors).
140. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 13, at 58 (justifying adverse possession as a
cure to an owner’s “strategic behavior [setting] a trap [for] innocent occupants”).

2658

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

an efficient deal between possessor and owner.141 Prevalent efficiencygrounded explanations of adverse possession provide only blank statements
about the prohibitive costs of using the formal system to complete the ownerpossessor deal.142
An efficiency justification for adverse possession demands more. The
forced transfer of property from an allegedly less efficient user to its
allegedly most efficient user runs counter to the logic of economic analysis.
Furthermore, it similarly runs counter to the logic of current laws.143 For
example, the owner of Vincent van Gogh’s most important masterpiece could
store it in an underground basement on a deserted island and only choose to
bring it out during rainstorms for use as cover for her lawn furniture.144 Still,
the law does not remove it from her and bestow it to a public museum where
it would clearly be much more appreciated.145 A developer cannot
unilaterally take hold of old unused industrial grounds that could produce
more social value as commercial or residential lands; even the government
itself is not always free to do so.146 In a capitalist system, the law does not
just redistribute property to its better user.
Given efficiency theory’s, and the law’s, strong belief in and commitment
to market efficiency, exceptional transaction costs justifying the
displacement of market transactions cannot simply be assumed. If adverse
possession is to be justified on transaction costs grounds—as it must for an
efficiency account—these costs must be identified. A positive answer must
141. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1131 n.38 (explaining that, given the time the landowner
would have to wait postconstruction, the scenario is unlikely).
142. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 101, at 154 (“[A] rule for acquiring title by
adverse possession lowers the cost of establishing rightful ownership claims by removing the
risk that ownership will be disputed . . . .”); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The
Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 678 (1986) (“[Adverse
possession] spares the rightful owner the costs of litigation that might otherwise be needed to
establish title.”).
143. See White Bros. & Crum Co. v. Watson, 117 P. 497, 499 (Wash. 1911) (“The next
step in the invasion of the right of property would be to invite the courts to measure the
comparative needs of private parties, and compel a transfer to the one most needing and who
might best utilize the property. If a man may be required to surrender what is his own because
he does not need it and cannot use it, and because another does need it and can use it, then
there is no reason why he may not be required to surrender what he needs but little because
another needs it much. A doctrine so insidiously dangerous should never find lodgment in the
body of the law through judicial declaration.”).
144. See JOSEPH SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
IN CULTURAL TREASURE 1(1999) (“Many of the greatest artifacts of our civilization can be
owned by anyone who has the money to buy them, or the luck to find them, and their owners
can then treat the objects however their fancy or their eccentricity dictates. A standard text
puts it bluntly enough: ‘[A]n eccentric American collector who, for a Saturday evening’s
amusement, invited his friends to play darts using his Rembrandt portrait as the target would
neither violate any public law nor be subject to any private restraint.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting 6 FRANKLIN FELDMAN ET AL., ART LAW: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF CREATORS AND
COLLECTORS § 5.1.1, at 434 (1986))).
145. See Shoked, supra note 86, at 822 (discussing droit de suite and redesigning this
element of copyright law to “make royalties payable to a public entity promoting public access
to art”).
146. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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be provided to the question: are there attributes of the market for land
rendering certain desirable deals between owners and long-term possessors
prohibitively, though artificially, expensive?
C. Adverse Possession as Quieting Title
The only way in which adverse possession can be portrayed as efficient is
as a means for reducing the procedural costs of transacting. Thus, perhaps
the doctrine’s explanation should be sought in justifications that are explicitly
concerned not with the property system’s substantive goals (for example,
reliance or efficiency) but rather with the procedures employed to achieve
those goals. And indeed, a justification is often provided for adverse
possession that focuses not on property law’s substance but on its form.
Precisely because it is not focused on the law’s substantive goals, such a
justification is appealing to a diverse group of writers. For it can easily
complement any of the explanations for adverse possession seen above.147
A body of law, such as property or contract law, is not only committed to
certain substantive goals, but it is also committed to effective administration
of the law.148 Form, not just substance, animates legal doctrines and, at
times, might even be prioritized over substance.149 Thus, some specific
doctrines, such as adverse possession, can perhaps best be explained as
occupied not with any of the law’s overriding goals but with smooth
administration of the law.150 The desire to promote smooth administration
of property laws has been a function ascribed to the doctrine ever since its
inception: adverse possession is said to be needed to “quiet title.”151 That
is, it “makes ownership more settled or certain.”152 Because property, more
than most other legal institutions, is geared toward facilitating impersonal
interactions respecting fixed assets, such ease of administration is seen as a
benefit in and of itself.153 It can further serve any of property’s contesting
substantive goals discussed earlier. Quieting title allows individuals to rely
147. See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
148. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1686–87 (1976).
149. See Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671, 1674–75 (2016) (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court Justices
often align not in accordance with their substantive preferences but with their preferences
respecting legal doctrines’ form or methodology).
150. See Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision: A Theory of Judicial Decision
for Today, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923) (arguing that “rules . . . applied mechanically
are more adapted to property . . . [while] standards where application proceeds upon intuition
are more adapted to human conduct and to the conduct of enterprises”); Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988) (“Property law . . . has
always been heavily laden with hard-edged doctrines that tell everyone exactly where they
stand.”).
151. Quieting title is one of the earliest justifications provided for adverse possession. The
earliest statute protecting possessors opened with the statement: “For quieting of Men’s
Estates, and avoiding of Suits, Be it enacted . . . .” The Limitation Act 1623, 21 Jac. c. 16
(Eng.).
152. Stake, supra note 1, at 2441.
153. See Pound, supra note 150, at 951.
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on their relationships with their lands and with their neighbors.154 It also
facilitates market transactions.155
Adverse possession simplifies the administration of property law—quiets
title—by curbing litigation and adjusting legal realities to reflect realities on
the ground. The doctrine authorizes a court to refuse to accommodate, or
even hear, certain claims. A judicial willingness to adjust land rights to any
relevant claim would engender an excess of litigation.156 For example, if a
neighbor knows that a court will never budge from a formal boundary line,
the neighbor will persist in a dispute even if he does not care much about the
contested land.157 In such and all other potential cases, courts and parties
must waste resources in investigating all rights and claims that might have
ever applied to contested land.158 Such investigations into the past and into
all contending claims are costly affairs that often yield indeterminate
findings. The constant threat of such potential claims alone suffices to cloud
property ownership with uncertainty.159 Adverse possession removes that
cloud. It empowers a court to announce that claims are stale—to ignore
claims irrespective of their actual merit.160 Adverse possession streamlines
property rights’ definition by subjecting to a technical cutoff date all
challenges to existing property rights.161
Adverse possession’s mode of identifying those existing property rights
that are shielded from potential litigants’ claims is presented as the ultimate
simplification device.162 The doctrine simply announces that recognized
legal rights are to be derived from facts anyone can physically observe when
visiting a property today.163 Adverse possession, in other words, equates
legal reality with reality on the ground.164 Such a move renders

154. Stake, supra note 1, at 2441–42.
155. Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 142, at 678.
156. See, e.g., Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135,
136–37 (1918) (detailing the many pieces of evidence an individual would have to provide if
she had to prove that she holds a good interest against all potential claims); see also supra
note 142 and accompanying text.
157. See Epstein, supra note 142, at 676–77.
158. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 101, at 154 (“[A]dverse possession lowers the
[administrative] cost[s] of establishing rightful ownership claims by removing the risk that
ownership will be disputed on the basis of the distant past.”).
159. See Stake, supra note 1, at 2441–42.
160. See 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 214–15 (Arthur T.
Hadley ed., rev. ed. 1900) (1848) (contending that adverse possession protects owners from
false claims that they gained title by force or fraud); Merrill, supra note 2, at 1129 (arguing
that adverse possession can remove potential defects in title, thereby making transacting
cheaper).
161. Netter et al., supra note 112, at 225 (explaining that adverse possession, by providing
certainty, increases land values).
162. Id.
163. But see Sterk, supra note 32, at 1296 (explaining that even abiding by the clear rules
generates high search costs since those observing reality are unaware of the rules).
164. See Muth & Cox, supra note 100, at 13.
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administering property rights exceptionally easy, and therein lies,
commentators argue, adverse possession’s great appeal.165
Yet, popular as the claim is, when actually fleshed out, the appeal of
adverse possession as an administrative tool is rather superficial.166 How
exactly is adverse possession “quieting?”167 Adverse possession is an
exceptionally complicated doctrine—counting at least five elements—that
necessitates intense judicial analysis.168 The doctrine determines who owns
contested land in light of multiple tests a court must apply individually to any
given set of facts.169 Some of these tests invite the court to engage in factintensive analysis adjusting results to specific circumstances. Consider
adverse possession’s hostility element, requiring (at a minimum) a
determination that the possessor was never granted permission to enter.170
Research into the parties’ behavior and communications over years and
decades is inescapable. Still other tests an adverse possession claim must
satisfy are rather open-ended. For example, what counts as “actual”
possession?171
According to the quieting title account, adverse possession assures an
observer that the person she sees on the land is the land’s owner, irrespective
of any potential contradictory claims.172 In actuality, however, adverse
possession only tells the observer that the person she sees is the owner if a
court at some later point deems that person to have actually possessed that
land exclusively, in a hostile manner, and openly, for a period of time the
statute sets.173 These determinations afford a court much discretion to seek
“fairness.”174 Turning to such subtle tools for the pursuit of a “fair” result
may perhaps be inevitable as long as adverse possession is a doctrine dealing
with squatters’ rights.175 In those extreme cases, substantive questions
geared toward ascertaining fairness are perhaps natural and might thus even

165. The easy administration of property rights is often presented as the only true
justification for adverse possession. See, e.g., Ballantine, supra note 156, at 135 (“The statute
has not for its object to reward the diligent trespasser for his wrong nor yet to penalize the
negligent and dormant owner for sleeping upon his rights; the great purpose is automatically
to quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted . . . .”).
166. See Stake, supra note 1, at 2448–49.
167. See Kristine S. Cherek, From Trespasser to Homeowner: The Case Against Adverse
Possession in the Post-Crash World, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 271, 285 (2012) (explaining
that it is unclear why today—unlike in the past—the land system requires adverse possession).
168. See Fennell, supra note 65, at 1062 (“A review of the law of adverse possession
reveals it to be a stunningly weak vessel for delivering repose.”).
169. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
170. See 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 87.10.
171. Id. § 87.04 (discussing how to determine when one has “actual” possession of
property).
172. See, e.g., Ballantine, supra note 156, at 136 (“[I]f the exercise of apparent ownership
is made conclusive evidence of title, this wholesale method necessarily establishes and quiets
the bad along with the good. The trespasser benefits, the true owner suffers, for the repose of
meritorious titles generally.”).
173. See Apperson v. White, 950 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
174. See Rose, supra note 150, at 591.
175. SINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 311.
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appear predictable to parties.176 But as this Article stresses, the doctrine
currently inhabits the boundary-dispute universe, and there, these substantive
considerations are not as obviously important or intuitive. Courts’ leeway in
analyzing them is so ample that individuals’ ability to predict results when
contemplating contested boundaries is exceptionally limited.177
Under the scheme commonly employed to categorize a doctrine’s mode of
administering legal results, adverse possession is the quintessential
standard.178 Legal doctrines assume one of two forms: rules or standards.179
Rules prescribe specific results—they draw clear lines. Judges faced with a
factual pattern can mechanically apply the rule dictating an outcome.180
Standards are rules’ opposites as they supply a court with flexibility to
analyze each case in light of policies it seeks to promote.181 The argument
that adverse possession is necessary to quiet rights is an argument that a
standard is necessary to provide clarity—and that is a particularly peculiar
argument. Rules, not standards, are normally associated with that
clarification function.182 As a standard, adverse possession is a very “noisy”
doctrine that renders property rights more—not less—expensive to
discern.183
The traditional quieting title justification for adverse possession thus
cannot solve the problem the doctrine’s efficiency justification
encountered.184 That challenge was the need to identify the transaction costs
allegedly blocking a voluntary deal between owner and possessor. The
quieting title justification merely refocuses the problem. If a doctrine whose
application is anything but straightforward is necessary to quiet title, title in
its absence must be shown to be tremendously unquiet.
Why would the property system’s administration be unbearably costly in
the doctrine’s absence? How does property law generate legal claims whose
determination is costlier than the application of an unpredictable standard
cutting them off? What are the impossible difficulties that render a clumsy
standard necessary as a clarifying device? Without answering these
questions—as opposed to just assuming the answers185—any explanation for
adverse possession’s persistence remains lacking. For that reason, the next

176. See Sterk, supra note 32, at 1295–97 (explaining that property rules can be costly
because they entail search costs: a need for lay parties to figure out the answers to questions
they cannot even recognize before consulting legal experts).
177. See also Sipe, supra note 2, at 855 (explaining that because adverse possession, unlike
formal title, enables courts to exercise discretion through the doctrine’s tests and establish
their own views of the appropriate boundaries, the doctrine generates irregular boundaries).
178. See SINGER, supra note 21, at 162–63.
179. See Kennedy, supra note 148, at 1687–88.
180. Id. at 1688–89.
181. Id. at 1688.
182. Id. at 1688–89.
183. See supra note 168.
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 65, at 1063–64 (assuming that modern law has better
tools for quieting title); Merrill, supra note 2, at 1129 (assuming that adverse possession is the
most efficient tool for that purpose).
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part will answer those questions to thereby develop a more coherent
justification for adverse possession than the existing ones this part reviewed.
II. THE NEED THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION ACTUALLY ANSWERS
Jane is buying Blackacre from John. How does she know what
Blackacre’s boundaries are? How does she know what John’s rights are
there? In the simplest of terms, how can Jane make sure she is buying what
she thinks she is buying? Practitioners and scholars are all well acquainted
with the formal rules dictating the procedures for completing land
transactions. Still, heretofore, these rules have hardly been thoroughly
considered when justifying adverse possession.186 Yet, Part I showed that
the sole way to justify adverse possession is through exploring these
procedures.187 Adverse possession can only be vindicated if, standing alone,
these formal mechanisms for defining boundaries erect an unsatisfactory
system that must be supplemented by that costly doctrine.
This part therefore reviews the formal rules property law uses to set
boundaries. It first introduces the seemingly optimal system—a registration
system. Then it turns to the suboptimal system American law employs—a
recording system. Thereafter, it presents the mechanisms rendering this
suboptimal system workable:
adverse possession alongside private
insurance. This exercise explains the persistence of adverse possession and
the role the doctrine plays in our property system. It also facilitates an
assessment of that role and a comparison, which concludes this part, of the
American system for setting boundaries and the optimal system.
A. The Straightforward Formal System for Land Management: A Registry
Most individuals probably envision a straightforward system for
transacting in land.188 When Jane contemplates purchasing Blackacre, she
should be able to turn to a central database telling her what Blackacre’s
boundaries are, who owns Blackacre, and whether there are any other rights
or obligations associated with Blackacre (easements, such as rights of way,
and covenants, such as building restrictions, for example). This information
should be readily legible. A database should thus provide Jane with a

186. Authors simply assume that the formal system is operable and, hence, adverse
possession adds costs to it. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 1, at 2439–40 (“Compared with the
rules of title transfer, which determine record title primarily from documents that remain
reliable for many years, the elements of adverse possession are indeterminate . . . . Long ago,
before deeds were recorded in county courthouses, adverse possession might well have
reduced the costs of litigation . . . . Today, deeds and probated wills, even old ones, are easily
found, and record title is inexpensively resolved. Because the elements of adverse possession
are harder to determine than record title, a concern for reducing the amount spent on the
judicial system would not seem an adequate justification for continuing to adhere to the
doctrine of adverse possession.”).
187. See supra Part I.
188. See C. Dent Bostick, Land Title Registration: An English Solution to an American
Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 55, 61–62 (1987).
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detailed map of Blackacre and inform her, say, that John owns a fee simple
there and no one else owns any rights therein.
Now assume that, based on this information, Jane purchases Blackacre
from John. Later, it turns out that the database had misplaced Blackacre’s
boundary. John only owned half of Blackacre: the other half actually forms
part of neighboring Greenacre, which David owns. Many individuals would
perhaps assume that because the mistake was not Jane’s, but rather embedded
in a database she must rely on, Jane should be shielded.
In other words, a purchaser of land likely expects the formal system to
satisfy two demands:
standardized information and assurances of
reliability.189 These elements appear necessary for a market in lands.190 If
people do not know what they are buying, they would hesitate before buying,
which would deter transactions.191 If they were to have access to that
information, but could not trust it, they would still hesitate, and transactions
would still be deterred. Because a working market is necessary for assets’
efficient allocation, and because land is an asset of limited quantity whose
inefficient allocation would be exceptionally costly for society, the legal
system strives to provide market actors with these two perquisites for a
willingness to transact in land.
In the common-law world, this function is performed through the Torrens
registration system.192 In a Torrens system, a central location—often, the
county office—will hold a registry containing information on all area lands.
In that registry, each lot has a unique number referencing the land as it
appears on a plan.193 The plan details the lot’s boundaries. It also lists the
names of the owners and of holders of any other interests.194 A transfer of
the lot is achieved only through changing that registration (to indicate the
name of the new owner or the new boundaries).195 In this manner the Torrens
registration system proffers standardized information about landholding.
It also assures reliability—actors’ second demand for entering a market.
Because in the Torrens system a land transfer is only completed through
registration, registered title is indefeasible.196 That is, an interest registered
cannot be challenged.197 While, as in any other human-managed system,

189. See Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 304–06 (1984) (explaining that information provided by a
registry is necessary for freedom to transfer property).
190. See id. at 305–06.
191. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Information, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 241 (2016) (“[T]he value of title to property rights vitally depends on
the degree to which it is known by people in the world . . . .”).
192. See Barry Goldner, The Torrens System of Title Registration: A New Proposal for
Effective Implementation, 29 UCLA L. REV. 661, 662 & n.6 (1982). The Torrens system is
named for the South Australia premier who introduced it in 1858. Id. at 662 n.6.
193. Id. at 677–79, 677 n.86.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 679–80.
196. Id. at 676.
197. Id. at 677–79, 677 n.86.
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mistakes may occur, the state guarantees the Torrens registry’s accuracy.198
If the registry contains a mistake in the description of the land or its owner
the purchaser relying on the registry in good faith still holds good title.199
Although the registered owner, John, from which the purchaser, Jane, bought
the land only owned half the land, Jane will keep the land she bought as
described in the registry. The true original owner of the other half of the
land, David, who would consequently lose his interest, will receive monetary
compensation from a state-managed assurance fund, which is funded through
registration fees.200
The Torrens registration system thus furnishes land purchasers with the
two elements they demand. First, it is a standardized system providing
readily available accurate information (nowadays, it can be accessed online).
Second, it is a highly effective insurance system, promising the purchaser
that the land as they see it in the registry will be what they receive. In case
of mistake, the purchaser will lose nothing: they will not even have to settle
for monetary compensation. They will keep the land as originally described.
B. The American Formal System for Land Management: A Record
The Torrens registration system simplifies land transactions and is thus
aligned with popular intuitions. Yet it is not the system American states
adhere to.201 Instead, American law relies on a recording system.
The differences between the Torrens registration system and the recording
system flow from the disparate manners for concluding land deals in each.
As noted, in a Torrens system, a land transfer is completed through
registration. Conversely, in a recording system, the transaction is not
completed by changing details in some central database.202 Rather, the
transaction is completed by the grant of a deed from the owner.203 That deed,
in turn, need not be reported to a central authority or made public in any other
198. Id. at 678–80.
199. Id. at 693.
200. Id. at 680–81.
201. For an overview of the historic debates, as well as the U.S. experience with different
registration systems, see BLAIR C. SHICK & IRVING H. PLOTKIN, TORRENS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1–23 (1978). Nine states still allow for a registry but do not mandate registration. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-36-101 (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-40 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 501-1 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 185, § 1 (2021); MINN. STAT. § 508.01 (2021);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 370 (McKinney 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 43-1 (2021); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5309.01 (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.12.005 (2021). In most of
these states, the system is used only sporadically. The Torrens system is used to a substantial
extent in only four states: Hawaii (statewide), Massachusetts (statewide), Minnesota (select
counties), and Ohio (select counties). See John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land
Title Assurance in the Computer Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 73 (1992).
202. Unless a specific statute requires that a deed be recorded to take effect. See, e.g., MD.
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-101 (LexisNexis 2021). Slightly more prevalent is mandatory
recording of only certain specific interests, such as mortgages. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-40102 (2021); 21 PA. CONS. STAT. § 621 (2021).
203. See 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 1055, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020) (“The
grantor, it is said, divests himself of the title by the delivery of the deed and the acceptance is
the act by which the grantee is invested with the title . . . .”).
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way to take effect.204 A purchaser can keep her deed in her bedroom and the
land will remain hers.205 The system does, however, provide the purchaser
with an incentive to make the transfer public.206 If a purchaser does not
record her deed, a later purchaser of the same land from the original seller—
who happens to be a swindler—could trump the earlier purchaser’s rights.207
To protect her rights by putting such potential future buyers on notice of her
purchase, a purchaser thus has an incentive to file her deed with the recorder
of deeds208—normally, the county office.209 Thanks to this legal incentive,
deeds are almost universally recorded.210
But the resulting record is just that: a compilation of all deeds filed in the
county.211 The record merely provides evidence of deals, rather than actually
embodying them (as it does in a Torrens system).212 Even as a record of
deals, it is quite deficient.213 Inconveniently, the record does not organize
the pieces of evidence—the deeds—by lot but indexes them by names of
sellers and purchasers.214 Moreover, because the deeds are merely stored for
future observers’ use, they are not subject to any review for validity.215
When a new deed for a purchase of Blackacre is filed, it might not correspond
204. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Berrett, 910 A.2d 1072, 1080 n.4 (Md. 2006) (stating
that an unrecorded deed is valid between the grantor and grantee and also as to third persons
with actual notice).
205. Homeowners Fin. Co. v. Stuart, No. CV-186010887, 2019 WL 2573805, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2019) (stating that the recording system “does not act to divest a bona fide
owner of its ownership status”).
206. One state, Arizona, provides the grantor, rather than the grantee, with an incentive to
record. Under Arizona law, the grantor must record within sixty days, and if she fails to do
so, she might have to indemnify the grantee if an action arises where the title is at issue. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-411.01 (2021).
207. See 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 4, Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2020) (noting that all states now have recording acts that aim to incentivize prompt recordation
by according priority of right to the purchaser who records first).
208. See Ralph W. Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MICH. L. REV. 405,
415 (1924) (“[T]he person claiming under the instrument in question by his failure to observe
the direction of the statute confers upon the party who executed the instrument . . . a sort of
statutory power to displace the interest vested by the execution of the instrument.”).
209. See Bostick, supra note 188, at 68.
210. See BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE 55
(2012).
211. See 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 207, § 2.
212. 3 id. § 671 (“We speak of land titles in the United States as ‘record titles’ because
statutes in each state provide for the recordation of muniments of title in public records that
may be searched for evidence of who holds title to each parcel of land. Yet, the title examiner
should not take this to mean that the status of title to a parcel of land may be ascertained solely
from an examination of those public records. . . . [T]he recording statutes . . . merely afford[]
an additional method of giving constructive notice of one’s rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
Some states do accept the record as primary evidence with no requirement that the original
deed be produced—but there too, the record remains a tool for merely providing evidence,
even if primary rather than secondary. See PAUL E. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 13 (2d
ed. 1970).
213. See Muth & Cox, supra note 100, at 15–16.
214. Only a few states index by tract. See Note, The Tract and Grantor-Grantee Indices,
47 IOWA L. REV. 481, 486–87 (1962).
215. See Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts—Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 45 (1967).
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to an earlier deed selling Blackacre.216 The earlier deed could contain
different boundaries.217 Mistakes in descriptions, as well as typographical
errors, are rather routine.218 There need not even be common standards for
descriptions and boundaries219—so much so that sometimes a deed’s
description might not even produce a bounded tract.220 Consequently, rather
often, interpreting boundaries can be a tall task even for courts.221
Additionally, and inevitably, the identity of the person listed in the deed as
its current owner might be mistaken: an earlier deed giving rights to another
individual might have been misplaced, misfiled, or gone unfiled.
In sum, a record of deeds is very different from a registry. A recording
system, unlike a registration system, does not provide a snapshot of the layout
of, and rights in, all lots; rather, at best, it provides an archive of all
transactions made in the lot, as the transacting parties in each such deal chose
to define the lot.
Now consider again Jane’s situation as she seeks to purchase Blackacre
from its purported owner, John. When Jane approaches the record, she must
research the history of all transactions in Blackacre, examining all the deeds
to it, to verify that John has a good interest (i.e., she must know that John
acquired the land from an individual who actually owned it, and that that
individual had done the same, and so on, back in time). To further verify that
the interest she is obtaining from John is indeed the interest she thinks it is,
she must also verify that no discrepancies exist between all those deeds in
their descriptions of Blackacre. If such discrepancies exist—a not unlikely
eventuality, given that some deeds might have been drafted decades, if not
centuries, earlier222—the record, as a mere compilation of deeds, does not
settle them.223 It follows that if a mistake is found in the deed on which Jane
relies when purchasing Blackacre from John (say, the deed originally
transferring Blackacre to John mistakenly described it as including portions
of Greenacre), Jane loses the land she thought she had purchased. Because
an owner cannot convey more than what he owns, and the record does not
embody what John owned—it only provides evidence for what he owned—
216. See Cherek, supra note 167, at 286.
217. See, e.g., Macallister v. DeStefano, 463 N.E.2d 346, 349–50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
218. Cherek, supra note 167, at 286.
219. See Charles Szypszak, Real Estate Records, the Captive Public, and Opportunities for
the Public Good, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 5, 33 (2007) (noting the need “for a more precise and
consistent method of describing real estate parcels”).
220. See, e.g., Macallister, 463 N.E.2d at 347 (“[T]here is no dispute that were the first
course description in these deeds literally followed, there would be no closure of the
description of the parcel.”).
221. See, e.g., Greenan v. Lobban, 717 A.2d 989, 990 (N.H. 1998) (construing a deed
referencing a boundary “on the shore” of a lake); see also 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds §§ 247–69
(2007) (referencing numerous cases involving deed interpretation).
222. See Scott v. Anderson-Tully Co., 154 So. 3d 910, 913–15 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)
(explaining that since the contested land was originally surveyed in 1805, there was little
information for the parties to use when tracing that survey and thus concluding that neither
party could describe the disputed tract with accuracy or certainty).
223. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1128 (noting that recorded deeds may contain defects or
omissions and that surveying errors might result in misplaced boundary markers).
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if John did not own those portions of Blackacre, he could not have sold them
to Jane. Jane’s reliance on the record’s description of John’s rights could be
meaningless. David, neighboring Greenacre’s owner, could claim half of
Blackacre, land Jane thought she purchased based on an old faulty deed.
In and of itself, therefore, the recording system provides Jane with neither
the standardized information nor the assurance of reliability she demands
before freely transacting in land. The boundaries of the land the record
contains can be inconsistent, and they are never conclusive. Standing alone,
a recording system is painfully unsatisfactory. With that realization, an
answer to the puzzle that materialized at Part I’s conclusion—why adverse
possession is needed to complement or quiet the formal title system—is
within reach.
C. The Tools Rendering the American Formal System Workable: Adverse
Possession and Title Insurance
How does the American recording regime satisfy the purchaser’s two
demands—standardized information and reliability assurances—vital for
transacting in land? Because, unlike the Torrens registry, the recording
system itself is lacking, tools external to it must supply these elements.
Adverse possession, as this section explains, is one of those tools—
responsible mostly for the first element: standardizing information. But
adverse possession, as will also be seen, is an incomplete replacement for the
Torrens system. Adverse possession is an imperfect mechanism for
standardizing information and it furnishes very little assurance of reliability.
Another tool supplements it in facilitating land transactions in a recording
regime: private title insurance.224
Adverse possession can only be justified, as Part I concluded, if it proffers
a better alternative to the formal boundaries system. Because adverse
possession is a rather unruly standard, that premise could hold if the formal
system were extremely dysfunctional. Adverse possession could only be
appealing if the information the formal system provided about rights were
even less accurate than the murky predictions individuals can make
respecting future adverse possession rulings. As just seen in the preceding
section, those are exactly the circumstances presented by our land transacting
system. In a recording regime, the formal system does not even purport to
provide accurate information. A recording regime is, in this regard, the
opposite of a registration regime. A registry provides standardized, accurate
boundary information. Therefore, in Torrens systems, adverse possession is
normally disallowed.225 But that, again, is not the American system.
224. See generally 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 207, § 41
(discussing the alternative methods for protecting against title defects).
225. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-111 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 53
(2021) (“No title to registered land . . . shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 43–21 (2021) (“No title to nor right or interest in
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.”).
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As highlighted throughout this Article, adverse possession’s most striking
attribute is its emphatic rejection—indeed, overruling—of formal property
lines. As can now be understood though, that attribute is hardly troubling or
surprising. To the contrary, it is salutary and necessary.226 In our nonregistry
system, the rule the formal boundaries represent, which the adverse
possession standard seemingly undermines, is not much of a rule to begin
with. Even referring to it as a rule is misleading. Giving voice to this insight,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently refused to adopt lot lines as the sole factor
determining compensation when government confiscates land. “Lot lines
have varying degrees of formality across the States, so it is difficult to make
them a standard measure . . . .”227 In a sense, American law does not
recognize true map lines. While they exist in a Torrens system, in a recording
system they do not, as the record offers no binding, central property maps.
All that the American system makes available to purchasers are descriptions
that parties drew in their deeds—descriptions that need not be consistent or
accurate.228
In such a legal universe, full reliance on the formal lines is impossible.
Contradictions between deeds describing the same land are inevitable, and
an earlier deed can be so ancient as to contain undecipherable boundary
descriptions.229 A purchaser desiring to know what she is buying based on
the formal system could survey the land, but given the formal system’s
inherent flaws, that survey would sometimes do her no good.230 Adverse
possession enables the purchaser to sidestep the problem and simply rely on
the land’s boundaries as currently occupied—that is, as the purchaser
observes them.231 Adverse possession is, therefore, the requisite informal
alternative to the formal system, which by definition cannot supply the
purchaser with one of her two demands for engaging the market:
standardized information.
Adverse possession does little, however, to answer the purchaser’s second
demand—assurance of that information’s reliability. Adverse possession
does assure a purchaser that if she buys the land in reliance on mistaken
information, and then occupies it in a manner meeting certain conditions for
226. See CALLAHAN, supra note 41, at 99 (acknowledging that if the United States were to
adopt a Torrens system, “adverse possession would be not only unnecessary but undesirable”).
227. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1948 (2017).
228. See, e.g., In re Zahradka, 472 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (settling an
ownership dispute resulting from deeds to adjoining lands, both of which included the
contested area and where one of the descriptions was ambiguous); Martin v. Amerman, 133
S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. 2004) (discussing an ownership dispute over a thirty-foot strip of land
between two neighbors, who had conflicting surveys and where their disagreement appeared
to have centered on identification of a one-and-a-half-inch pipe noted in previous surveys as
the proper corner location).
229. An early writer identified the problem of boundaries in the eastern states, which were
originally fixed in reliance on arbitrary outlines, such as “trees or other natural monuments.”
See H. W. Chaplin, Record Title to Land, 6 HARV. L. REV. 302, 305 (1893).
230. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1128.
231. See, e.g., Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (awarding,
through adverse possession, land occupied by previous possessors, where all deeds, going
back forty years, mistakenly described the land as fifty feet to the east).
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a long period of time, her right will not be contested based on that original
mistake. But with the need to hold the land unchallenged for a lengthy period
of time, and with so many requirements to be ascertained before immunity
from suit is granted under adverse possession, this is a rather weak assurance.
If the purchaser eventually meets the doctrine’s conditions, adverse
possession will shield her, but until then it does not vouch for the information
the purchaser receives when buying the land. The doctrine, as seen, does not
simply transform reality on the ground into binding legal reality: it does not
automatically deem the actual boundary the formal one. Although it
conveniently transforms the current situation into the legal situation, it first
demands that several conditions be met. Thanks to adverse possession, the
fence the potential purchaser can physically see is deemed the land’s legal
boundary, irrespective of the formal line—but only if the fence has been
there, continuously, for the statutorily mandated period of time, was not
permitted, and maybe more.232 A purchaser will encounter much difficulty
in predicting whether the fence has met these criteria. A purchaser is not
assured, therefore, that the boundary she sees will be the one afforded her
postpurchase. No assurance is provided that a court will not later hold that
the boundary she saw must shift because some requirements for a successful
adverse possession claim failed.
Additionally, by basing legal boundaries on circumstances on the ground,
adverse possession introduces new uncertainties into the transacting process.
Because it might render a possessor the owner, a purchaser buying from the
owner might later find out that some of the owner’s land has actually shifted
to a possessor of whom she was unaware.233 Adverse possession, therefore,
through the very scheme it sets for providing buyers with information about
the land, increases those purchasers’ accompanying need for assurance.
Because neither the record nor adverse possession meaningfully do so,
another, more effective, tool is needed to satisfy purchasers’ demand for
assurance (which the Torrens system answers abroad). That tool emerged in
America in the late nineteenth century—around the time the Torrens system
was spreading elsewhere. It was private title insurance.234
Generally, insurance is the market’s answer to situations where an
individual would rather not bear a risk. Individuals would rather not contend
with the chance that their houses burn down, so they buy fire insurance; they
would rather not carry the costs if their cars are stolen, so they buy car
insurance. In these and many other cases, individuals pay another entity—
an insurance company—a premium in advance, and if the feared eventuality
occurs—their houses burn down, their cars are stolen—the insurance

232. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
233. See CALLAHAN, supra note 41, at 100–02 (noting that adverse possession actually
leaves buyers with less assurance when they are contemplating a transaction, as it can only
raise doubts respecting the owner’s title).
234. In 1874, Pennsylvania passed the first statute authorizing the incorporation of title
insurance companies. The first company was incorporated the following year. For the history
of title insurance, see BARLOW BURKE, LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE § 1.01 (3d ed. Supp. 2021).
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company covers the loss.235 Individuals thus, for a price, shift the risk of loss
to the insurance company.236
Title insurance was developed to perform the same function. When she
buys land, the purchaser pays the insurance company a fee. In exchange, if
at a later date a mistake is discovered in the original land description and the
buyer must give up parts of the land, the insurance company pays the
disappointed purchaser compensation reflecting the loss.237 In this way, title
insurance assures a buyer contemplating purchasing land that her investment
will not be lost if that land’s description turns out to be inaccurate. Given
how crucial that assurance is, title insurance is now a part of every land
deal.238 As one court put it: “It is a matter of common knowledge and
experience that in the usual situation, title insurance is indispensable to the
occurrence of the real estate sale: a seller would be unable to sell his property
at its reasonable value if no title company was willing to insure title.”239
Operating in tandem with the record, adverse possession and title
insurance thus fulfill, in our system, a registry’s twin functions: making
available legible information about land and providing assurance against
mistakes. It is important to note, however, that the two mechanisms deliver
on these functions only partially as compared to the Torrens registration
system. Adverse possession offers legible information about boundaries—
but that information is never fully accurate. Title insurance assures the
purchaser that if the information is mistaken, she will not lose her
investment—but she will still lose the land (having to settle for monetary
compensation) and she is not protected against title defects that emerge
postpurchase (for example, from a later neighbor’s intrusion materializing
into an adverse possession claim).240
D. The Explanation for the American System: Social Interest
Adverse possession has an important function in our property regime. The
doctrine aids in replacing a registration system with a record system. The
question then becomes why the law deems the record system a worthwhile
replacement for that more straightforward and fully effective system. The
obvious appeal of any partial solution is the alleged savings it offers as
compared to a more complete solution to the relevant problem.241 That is
how the American choice to adhere to a recording system rather than the
235. See Quintin Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 492 & n.1 (1957).
236. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 93
(1996).
237. The insurance company will also defend the purchaser in any pertinent legal
proceedings. See Johnstone, supra note 235, at 500.
238. See Zane O. Gresham, The Residential Real Estate Transfer Process: A Functional
Critique, 23 EMORY L.J. 421, 453 (1974).
239. Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564, 574 (E.D. Pa.),
order supplemented by 384 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
240. Nor is she protected from any other risk the specific policy she acquires excludes from
coverage.
241. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 189, at 305, 311 (arguing that since setting up and
maintaining registries is costly, it may not be beneficial to establish registries in all cases).
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optimal registration system is often justified.242 As this section establishes,
that justification should also be read as the explanation for the law’s
insistence on maintaining adverse possession, whose existence is tied to that
of the recording system.
In Part II.A, the registration system was offered as an intuitive fix for an
inevitable problem. It was presented as the most effective system for
managing the market for land. That impression is skewed, however: the
review focused on a registry’s benefits without sufficiently accounting for its
price. A registration system can be a rather costly affair, and therein lies its
major drawback—and the replacement’s attraction.
Intuitive as the registration system appears, putting it in place is an
extremely complicated endeavor.243 The reason is the guaranteed standing
of the snapshot of rights the registry contains. If a mistake is found in that
snapshot, the state, as noted, must indemnify the owner. Perhaps more
importantly, such a mistake will force the true owner to part with her interest
in the land. For if, when the state first introduces the registry, John is
mistakenly registered as an owner of parts of Greenacre that in fact belong to
David, then that land now legally belongs to John. David will have to content
himself with monetary compensation from the state. This elevated status of
the registry as legally conclusive once put in place mandates that it be
produced only following a highly meticulous process. Because once
registered, rights cannot be dislodged (and those rights not registered
disappear), in establishing the registry, all potential rights and claims to the
land must be investigated.244
In the United States, furthermore, that process probably cannot be fully
administrative.245 Courts have held that constitutional separation of powers
principles mandate judicial involvement in the investigation of rights to
land.246 Because the power to determine title is reserved to the judiciary, an
administrative agency cannot act alone.247 For every line drawn and interest
determined in the registration process, interested parties must have recourse
to the courts.248 Needless to say, this requirement slows down a registry’s

242. See RICHARD R. POWELL, N.Y.L. SOC’Y, REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE TO LAND IN THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 73 (1938).
243. See Goldner, supra note 192, at 687.
244. See id.
245. See id. (“A judicial proceeding is required under the fourteenth amendment’s due
process clause, which protects an individual’s property rights.”).
246. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kern v. Chase, 46 N.E. 454, 459 (Ill. 1896); State ex rel. Att’y
Gen. v. Guilbert, 47 N.E. 551, 558–59 (Ohio 1897).
247. Torrens statutes that states adopted after the first rulings instituted judicial
proceedings. See WILLIAM C. NIBLACK, AN ANALYSIS OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF
CONVEYANCING LAND § 27 (1912). Such schemes were upheld as constitutional. See
generally People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon, 52 N.E. 910 (Ill. 1898). Later challenges to the
system, alleging due process violations, failed as courts held that constructive notice to those
who might be affected—through, for example, newspaper ads—suffices. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 89 N.W. 175, 177–78 (Minn. 1902); Drake v. Fraser, 179 N.W. 393,
395 (Neb. 1920).
248. See Goldner, supra note 192, at 686.
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production.249 It also renders the process expensive: a court system (or
added burdens on the existing system), alongside lawyers arguing cases, must
be funded.250
A registration system thus involves high start-up costs. These costs then
enable the system, once established, to operate very cheaply.251 After the
registry is in place, an actor contemplating a deal in land need only consult
the registry to see who owns interests therein.252 No further verification is
necessary. The costs of transacting parties’ operating convenience are
covered earlier by the state establishing the registry.
The choice to forgo a registry spares the state those costs. The recording
system, accompanied by adverse possession, is costly for transacting parties:
adverse possession introduces the constant threat of litigation and, regardless,
anyone transacting in land must pay a title insurance company. However, it
is a very cheap system to establish. All it calls on the state to do is establish
an office where parties can record deeds.
In the choice between a system with high setup costs and low operating
costs (a registry), and one with the opposite (a record), American states opted
for the latter. American law can be understood to have preserved a role for
adverse possession because it prefers the second of the two systems of
funding land transaction costs.253 The American regime assumes that the
ongoing operational costs adverse possession and insurance present are lower
than the setup costs associated with a registry. Furthermore, by embracing
this funding route, the financial burden is shifted from the state to private
actors.
In the early twentieth century a few states toyed with the introduction of a
registration system, but after brief experiments, they apparently concluded
that, on the whole, the recording system’s operating costs are a bearable price
to pay to avoid a registry’s high up-front costs.254 As a way of funding land
deals’ transaction costs, the American regime assumes today that retaining
the recording system is cheaper than having a more dependable formal
system—even if the recording system comes with the added cost of adverse
possession. But is this assumption sensible?

249. The time required for completing the initial registration of one sole parcel was once
assessed to be between two months and a year. Ted J. Fiflis, Land Transfer Improvement: The
Basic Facts and Two Hypotheses for Reform, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 473–74 (1966).
250. See Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and Adverse Possession Reform
Act, a Proposal for Reform of the United States Real Property Law, 12 BUFF. ENV’T L.J. 1, 21
(2004).
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 207, § 2.
253. See Sterk, supra note 32, at 1288 (arguing that property rules are about regulating
search costs in an efficient manner).
254. See Bostick, supra note 188, at 73 (“At their zenith, [in the] early [twentieth] century,
some twenty states and one or two territories had adopted some version of registration. Many
of those states have since repealed the statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
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E. The Explanation for the American System: Private Interest
The descriptively compelling justification for adverse possession
uncovered in the preceding section is not necessarily also normatively
compelling. That justification centers, as seen, on a cost assessment: on the
belief that the recording system that adverse possession accompanies is
cheaper than the alternative mechanism for managing boundaries, a Torrens
system. Is that a fair assessment? This section will explain why the answer
probably is no. It will further explain that adverse possession’s persistence
in our legal system owes less to the relative magnitude of its costs (compared
to those of a registry) and more to the identity of the actors bearing those
costs. In the competition over legal reform, those who benefit from the
recording system, which necessitates adverse possession, form the more
effective interest group as compared to those the system and the doctrine
disadvantage.
The examination of adverse possession’s efficacy centers on the
alternative registry system’s costs. The initial costs of adopting such a
system are presented as insurmountable.255 On paper, there is much
supporting that projection. The actual evidence, however, indicates
otherwise. The allegedly financially out of reach Torrens system has been
spreading throughout the world consistently.256 So much so that the
American insistence on retaining a recording system and the accompanying
adverse possession doctrine is now clearly the minority position. Commonlaw systems elsewhere have almost uniformly shifted to the Torrens system.
All Australian states and territories,257 almost all Canadian provinces,258
New Zealand,259 Ireland,260 Scotland,261 Israel,262 and Singapore,263 now
rely on registration systems. Even England, birthplace of the old system on
which the American regime is grounded,264 started its shift toward a
registration system back in 1925.265 As they switched to a Torrens
255. See SHICK & PLOTKIN, supra note 201, at 51–56, 69–70; F. V. Balch, Land Transfer—
a Different Point of View, 6 HARV. L. REV. 410, 414 (1893); Fiflis, supra note 249, at 431–32;
Goldner, supra note 192, at 687; Dale A. Whitman, Transferring North Carolina Real Estate
(pt. 2), 49 N.C. L. REV. 593, 612 (1971).
256. See generally ARRUÑADA, supra note 210.
257. Shane Simmons, An Overview of Adverse Possession in Australia Within the
Framework of the Torrens System of Land Registration and Comment on a Related Court
Case, 2009 PROC. SURVEYING & SPATIAL SCIS. INST. BIENNIAL INT’L CONF. 175, 175.
258. Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island are the exceptions. See generally GREG
TAYLOR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE ADVENT OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM IN CANADA (2008).
259. The Land Transfer System, LAND INFO. N.Z., https://www.linz.govt.nz/land/landregistration/land-transfer-system [https://perma.cc/VN7E-LBLY] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
260. Land Registry Services, PROP. REGISTRATION AUTH., https://www.prai.ie/landregistry-services [https://perma.cc/LF67-JJGC] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
261. Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, (ASP 5) § 1.
262. Land Law, 5729–1969, LSI 23 283 (1968–69) (Isr.).
263. Land Titles Act (Cap. 157, 1959 rev. ed.) s 5 (Sing.).
264. 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 207, § 3.
265. Most prominently the 1925 law defined registration itself as conferring the title, not
the deed, as before. Land Registration Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 21, § 69 (Eng.) (repealed).
Thus, no transfer occurs before a transaction is registered. Id. § 19(1).
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registration system, most of these jurisdictions jettisoned adverse
possession266 or at least rendered it peripheral and ineffective.267 Some
specifically prohibited adverse possession in boundary disputes.268 England,
from where the doctrine hails,269 effectively abandoned adverse possession
in the Land Registration Act of 2002270 that perfected its registration
system.271
This comparative finding vindicates this Article’s argument that adverse
possession’s role is to police boundaries in the absence of a reliable formal
boundary system.272 In addition, the marked global trend casts serious doubt
on the claim that a registry is inherently, and dramatically, more expensive
than continued reliance on adverse possession. Apparently, many other
jurisdictions whose property law systems are not alien to ours found the costs
of introducing a Torrens system bearable and justified. Struck by this reality,
one commentator noted:
It is a baffling fact that the United States is rapidly becoming virtually the
only country in the world whose land title system is not founded upon
Torrens-type principles . . . . [I]t [is] incredible that a system which seems
to work quite well almost everywhere else cannot be satisfactorily adapted
to the United States.273

Scholarly consensus among American writers thus insists that a Torrens
system is dramatically more effective than the current American system.274
266. Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 45D (Austl.) (barring adverse possession in
registered land); Land Law, 5729–1969 (no adverse possession); Sarah E. Hamill, Common
Law Property Theory and Jurisprudence in Canada, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 679, 690 (2015)
(reporting that all Canadian common-law provinces except Alberta have abolished adverse
possession). See generally Fiona Burns, Adverse Possession and Title-by-Registration
Systems in Australia and England, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 773 (2011) (discussing the doctrine’s
evolution in Australia).
267. New Zealand Land Transfer Act 2017, ss 162, 164 (N.Z.) (stating that an adverse
possession claim will be denied if the registered owner, once alerted by the registrar to whom
the possessor must apply, objects); Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, (ASP 5), sch.
4 (same in Scotland); Burns, supra note 266, at 802 (same in South Australia).
268. While some have adverse possession procedures, these jurisdictions limit them to
claims for whole lots. See Land Title Act 1994 (Qld.) s 98(1)(a)–(b) (Austl.); Land Titles Act
1980 (Tas.) s 138Y (Austl.); Land Transfer Act 2007, s 164 (N.Z.).
269. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES § 15.1 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (“The sole historical basis of title by adverse
possession is the development of statutes of limitations on actions for the recovery of land in
England . . . .”).
270. 2002, c.9 (U.K.).
271. The law mandates alerting the owner to an adverse possession claim, and that owner
can then veto the claim.
272. See Lisa M. Austin, Property and the Rule of Law, 20 LEGAL THEORY 79, 94–95
(2014) (noting that jurisdictions that adopt a Torrens system usually abolish adverse
possession).
273. Barnett, supra note 215, at 93–94.
274. See, e.g., Barnet, supra note 250, at 15–16; Bostick, supra note 188, at 57; Walter
Fairchild & William Springer, A Criticism of Professor Richard R. Powell’s Book Entitled
Registration of Title to Land in the State of New York, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 557, 557–58 (1938–
39) (book review); John T. Hassam, Land Transfer Reform. The Australian System, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 271, 274, 278–79 (1891); Joseph T. Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of the Land Title
Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 220–26 (1977); Myres S.
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Commentators reckon that American exceptionalism in the land registration
realm cannot be attributed to any exceptionally high costs American
constitutional strictures (for example, mandating judicial oversight of the
initial registration process) might generate because those can be, and have
been, controlled.275
American exceptionalism owes to a different, nonlegal, feature of the
system. The American land boundary management system has resisted
global trends because it has given rise to a powerful party that holds a
uniquely strong economic interest in the costs the current system generates—
a party that has successfully assured that the United States remains an outlier
in the common-law world. That party is the title insurance industry.
As Part II.C noted, two mechanisms treat the costs that the recording
system inevitably effects: adverse possession and title insurance.276 In a
Torrens registration system, the need for adverse possession, as already
noted, disappears, but so does the need for title insurance.277 Because the
registry itself insures a purchaser, few if any seek title insurance.278 As
registered title is indefeasible, its purchaser does not demand any sort of
private insurance.279 Though a useless product in a jurisdiction with a
registry, title insurance is an indispensable one in a recording system
jurisdiction.280 Therefore, the insurance industry is highly invested in—nay,
dependent on—maintaining the recording system. Predictably, it has
repeatedly opposed the introduction of a Torrens system.281 Most recently,
in 2018, the industry spent $400,000 on a lobbying campaign and
successfully pressed the New York legislature to delay the implementation
of a measure already passed to curb some of its practices.282 Even a measure
so minor it “hardly qualifie[d] as a reform measure” could not surmount the

McDougal & John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE L.J. 1125,
1151 (1939); Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, The Economics of Land Transfer and Title
Insurance, 10 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 81, 87 (1995); Thomas J. Miceli et al., Title Systems
and Land Values, 45 J.L. & ECON. 565, 578 (2002); Comment, Yes Virginia—There Is a
Torrens Act, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 301, 301 (1975).
275. See Barnet, supra note 250, at 5; Goldner, supra note 192, at 690.
276. See supra Part II.C.
277. Barnett, supra note 215, at 94.
278. The “certificate issued by the Registrar is not simply a certificate, but an absolute
guaranty of title by the Government.” Hassam, supra note 274, at 275.
279. See John E. Cribbet, Some Reflections on the Law of Land—a View from Scandinavia,
62 NW. U. L. REV. 277, 282 (1967) (noting that Scandinavian countries have a successful
Torrens registry and thus no private insurance market).
280. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
281. THOMAS W. MAPP, TORRENS’ ELUSIVE TITLE: BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF AN
EFFICIENT TORRENS’ SYSTEM 3 (1978); Barnet, supra note 250, at 13–14; Barnett, supra note
215, at 94; Frederick B. McCall, The Torrens System—After Thirty-Five Years, 10 N.C. L.
REV. 329, 349–50 (1931) (offering the existence of insurance companies as a possible
explanation for the Torrens system’s failure in North Carolina).
282. Shane Goldmacher, New York’s Hidden Home Buyer Closing Costs: Luxury Boxes
and Mint Mojitos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/01/29/nyregion/title-insurance-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/GWJ6-CL3E].
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Unsurprisingly, an actually
title insurance industry’s lobbying.283
transformative reform—a move to a registry—has consistently proven
unimaginable.284
The industry’s success in advocating for the proposition that “a little title
examination is a good thing,”285 (a proposition that few would have predicted
to curry much popular favor) is readily explicable in light of research into
interest group dynamics. One of public choice theory’s most fundamental
insights is that small, intensely interested groups can overcome collective
action hurdles that large, diffusely interested groups cannot.286 In the
competition for regulatory reforms, their lower information costs, lower
organization costs, and lower free rider costs combine to advantage narrowly
focused groups at the expense of larger groups.287
In debates over reforms of the boundaries management system, the title
insurance industry is the quintessential intensely interested group. The
market is dominated by four major companies forming a practical
monopoly.288 The risk that reform represents to these companies is
enormous: if the recording system is abandoned, their business will
collapse.289 On the other side, the group standing to benefit from reform is
the ultimate diffuse group—the general public.290 All property owners carry
the costs of the current recording system: every buyer must pay insurance
premiums whenever purchasing land and must then live under the constant
threat of adverse possession.291 Because these costs are diffused among all
members of the public though, no one entity or organization lobbies the
legislature to abolish the recording system generating these costs.292 Further
exacerbating the problem, individuals are highly unlikely to even note these
283. Jeff Andrews, Opinion, Title Insurance Is a Scam and It’s Time for a Government
Takeover, CURBED (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/2/26/17017142/titleinsurance-scam-government-takeover [https://perma.cc/5AUT-P4Z3].
284. In Iowa, the one state where a public assurance system replaced private insurance, see
infra notes 389–92 and accompanying text, regulators report that they must consistently fend
off industry lobbying efforts to get the legislature to abolish the public system. Andrews, supra
note 283.
285. Barnett, supra note 215, at 94.
286. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 22–33 (1971).
287. Paul J. Stancil, Assessing Interest Groups: A Playing Field Approach, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2008).
288. These companies are: Chicago Title, Fidelity National Title, Commonwealth Land
Title, and First American Title.
289. Johnstone, supra note 235, at 513 (asserting that title insurance companies oppose the
Torrens registration system because it threatens their “economic lives”).
290. See Gresham, supra note 238, at 471 (“The residential real estate transfer system in
many respects is inefficient and oppressive of the consumer, whether seller or buyer. Both
systemic flaws may be traced to the ignorance and disorganization of consumers and the
collusive practices of the institutional actors which in some contexts do not appear to operate
according to the traditional principles of free market competition.”).
291. Tenants also pay these costs. They are embodied in rents, as landlords pass all costs
of ownership to tenants.
292. Marion W. Benfield Jr., Wasted Days and Wasted Nights: Why the Land Acts Failed,
20 NOVA L. REV. 1037, 1061 (1996) (“Buyers and sellers of real estate act in that capacity so
rarely that they are not likely to develop views regarding the desirability of legal change.”).
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costs that they bear. Home buying, the occasion when insurance is acquired,
is a relatively infrequent experience for most individuals. Additionally,
because title insurance premiums are about 1 percent of a property’s sale
price,293 they are inconspicuous to buyers who, at the time of a deal’s closing
(when the insurance premium is paid), are confronted with a baffling array
of line items.294 The public is thus unlikely to appreciate the long-term
benefits it will derive from a registry sparing it insurance costs.295
Likewise, the ongoing threat—and cost—of adverse possession goes
unnoticed by owners, similarly weakening the political impetus for
change.296 Nonlawyers cannot be expected to be aware of a counterintuitive
legal doctrine that lurks, mostly silently, in the background of the
landholding regime. When adverse possession moves to the fore, the public
does tend to demand reform.297 In 2008, in two separate states, highly
publicized successful adverse possession claims generated public outcry,
which led legislatures to amend state laws and limit such claims.298 These
events denote the public’s attitude toward the current adverse possession
system’s costs: the public might find them unacceptable, but it is simply
unaware of them during regular times.299
This reality simplifies the insurance industry’s lobbying task (especially
as it finds lobbying allies in other interests, such as closing agents and
lawyers, similarly benefitting from the complexity of concluding real estate
transactions in a recording system). Legislators are easily made to balk at
proposals to fund a Torrens system.300 Faced with the prospects of raising
293. BURKE, supra note 234, § 1.01.
294. See Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolving
American Real Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 684 (2003).
295. Goldner, supra note 192, at 688.
296. The typical dynamics permitting rent seeking prevail here. “The rationally casually
ignorant voter is a very slender reed on which to build the foundations of democratic politics,”
because such a voter “is much more likely to be the recipient of the dispersed costs than of the
concentrated benefits of the legislative process.” GORDON TULLOCK, Rent Seeking, in THE
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 11, 46 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005).
297. In a similar context, one author has found that in Louisiana, judges too—when faced
with boundary disputes where a neighbor makes a prescriptive claim over another’s land—
feel unease about applying prescriptive doctrines that may misalign with community
expectations. John A. Lovett, Precarious Possession, 77 LA. L. REV. 617, 690–91 (2017).
298. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101(3)(b)(II) (2021). For background, see Heath Urie,
Couple Will Appeal ‘Adverse Possession’ Ruling, DAILY CAMERA ONLINE (Nov. 15, 2007),
https://la.utexas.edu/users/jmciver/357L/P3/BDC_Couple%20will%20appeal%20adverse%2
0possession%20ruling_111507.htm [https://perma.cc/25RR-J72U]. See also N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2021); Adam Leitman Bailey & John M. Desiderio,
Adverse Possession Changes Make Results Less Certain, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 11, 2009), https://
www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202428160650/?slreturn=20210209184134
[https://perma.cc/GB3L-HYVE].
299. Peter B. Maggs, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act and the Politics
and Economics of Law Reform, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1091, 1091–92 (1996) (explaining that land
reform’s benefits will be diffuse and hard to communicate to the general public).
300. Unappreciative of registration’s benefits, and left to their own devices, owners and
purchasers opt not to pay for registration. Goldner, supra note 192, at 688. A true reform
therefore requires making the registration system obligatory, and for that purpose, the state
must participate in funding it. Barnet, supra note 250, at 26.
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taxes—of which the public is always aware—to fund a solution for a problem
the public ignores and from which an industry group benefits, states
predictably embrace the status quo.301 They retain the current recording
regime as our system for managing land transactions. And adverse
possession persists: a doctrine necessitated by a boundary management
system that is socially wasteful but is a boon to a powerful industry.
III. LEGAL REFORMS IN LIGHT OF THE NEED THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION
ANSWERS
Part II explained both the need that adverse possession answers in our
property system and that need’s backdrop. It thereby established the practical
justification for adverse possession—and questioned its normative
justification. The specific task originally set for this Article has thus been
completed. But the answer provided for the Article’s theoretical question
respecting adverse possession’s logic can and should also impact the manner
in which current law is structured. Two distinct groups of lawmakers should
consider reforming the law in accordance with the theoretical findings: first,
judges confronted with adverse possession’s doctrinal details and, second,
state legislators concerned with rendering the home buying process cheaper
and fairer.
This part’s first section addresses the former audience. It inspects key
elements in the doctrine of adverse possession that have so far proved
incoherent or open to debate and shows how adverse possession’s true, and
very concrete, goal, as identified in this Article, might better inform their
analysis. This part’s second section turns to legislative reform. It draws on
this Article’s conclusions respecting adverse possession’s interplay with title
insurance to suggest better ways of regulating that industry.
A. Interpreting Adverse Possession’s Tests
Adverse possession lifts title from the owner and bestows it on the
possessor. For this transfer to occur, a possessor must meet specific criteria.
The normative goal behind the doctrine’s overall effect—the reason for its
choice to transfer land—should animate the specific criteria the doctrine
demands satisfied before that effect kicks in. Accordingly, many of the
writers attempting to explain adverse possession’s logic also endeavor to
account for the doctrine’s requirements or argue for their reform. Because
this Article suggested a different, and more realistic, explanation for the
doctrine’s continued existence, it is also better equipped to tackle some of the
doctrine’s specific elements that other accounts have struggled with. This
section thus reviews three such elements: the hostility requirement, the
notoriety requirement, and “color of title.”

301. Goldner, supra note 192, at 709 (stressing the public’s predictable opposition to the
costs of reform).
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1. Hostility
To win an adverse possession claim, a possessor must prove that her
possession was actual, open, continuous for the statutory period, exclusive,
and hostile.302 Perhaps inevitably, it is the latter, the hostility (or adversity)
element, that is key.303 It is the one element appearing in the doctrine’s name.
Yet surprisingly, hostility is the element many of the doctrine’s accounts
struggle most in explaining.
In light of the hostility requirement, a possessor holding land with the
owner’s permission will not win title, no matter how lengthy her
possession.304 This result is baffling for some of the most popular
explanations for adverse possession. Those who justify adverse possession
as a tool to protect a possessor’s reliance are pressed to explain the fact that
a nonadverse possessor cannot rely on the doctrine.305 If the doctrine’s
grounding is the desire to protect a person’s attachment to land she occupies,
permission—or lack thereof—to be on that land seems a wholly irrelevant
consideration. Just as a trespasser allegedly forms, over time, a connection
to a house or community, so does the licensee or tenant (i.e., a permitted
possessor).306 Protecting the former’s interest but not the latter’s appears
irrational if the interest adverse possession protects is merely that in reliance,
as these explanations for adverse possession contend.
Some of the efficiency-grounded justifications for adverse possession
similarly stumble in taking count of the hostility requirement. If adverse
possession’s logic is to enable land’s transfer to its most efficient user—who
allegedly is not its owner but its occupier—it should not always matter
whether that occupier is on the land without permission. Efficiency theories
assume that an owner who ignores her land and thus fails to notice an
occupier cares little about the land and is an ineffective user.307 But an owner
who grants permission to another to occupy her land for free or in exchange
for a nominal fee can hardly be said to always care more about the land. If
we assume that the former owner is sometimes an ineffective user (who
should lose her land) we might just as well assume the same respecting the
latter owner.308
The prevalent explanations for adverse possession reviewed above,
drawing on interests in reliance or efficiency, accordingly do not do a
particularly effective job in explaining the doctrine’s defining element: its
hostility requirement. The justification for adverse possession this Article
develops can much more readily explain it. The traditional theories fail in
302. See, e.g., Apperson v. White, 950 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
303. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 87.10 (“[N]o court has been found
to repudiate the essentials of hostility.”).
304. Id.
305. See supra Part I.A.
306. See Singer, supra note 82, at 622–23 (explaining that the reliance interest is relevant
in all property relationships).
307. See supra notes 105–06, 116–21 and accompanying text.
308. See Fennell, supra note 65, at 1066–67 (explaining that lack of permission or
knowledge does not suffice to establish that the possessor is the more efficient user).
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this task because a possessor’s reliance on land, or propensity to put it to
better use, are largely disconnected from the permission (or rather, lack of
permission) awarded to her to enter the land. By contrast, the justification
for adverse possession advanced in this Article is all about hostility, and
hence the doctrinal requirement materializes as wholly natural.
As Part II established, in actuality, adverse possession is set in order to
settle boundary disputes. Its raison d’être is, therefore, the dispute: the
disagreement over a boundary’s location. It follows that when such
disagreement is absent, as when one party permitted the other’s
encroachment, no recourse to the doctrine is necessary—or justified.
Property law has distinct, and separate, doctrines that can move the formal
boundary between lots when the bordering owners have in the past agreed to
diverge from that boundary.309 Adverse possession is meant to address the
case where no such agreement is present; indeed, as explained earlier, its
concern is that often such agreements are unrealistic, if not impossible, given
that formal boundaries in a record system are unclear.
This nature of adverse possession’s function should also explain why the
doctrine’s hostility element does not, in the vast majority of states, include a
subjective requirement.310 A few states add to the objective no-permission
test a subjective test, demanding that the entrant claiming land through
adverse possession act in good faith.311 That is, that the possessor thought
the land was hers and simply committed a mistake. An even smaller number
of states flip this subjective requirement: they demand that the possessor
know she is intruding.312 The courts adding either of these subjective
demands—good faith or intentional dispossession—are clearly in the
minority, however, and, given the insight into the doctrine’s true role this
Article provides, they should be.
Adverse possession’s goal is to proffer a system for boundary
management: a practical replacement for the formal system society refuses
to optimize. To achieve that goal, neither party’s mental state is relevant.
Furthermore, because the doctrine’s existence is premised on the realization
that often boundaries in a recording system are indiscernible, the doctrine
assumes that most boundary intrusions are, in a sense, in good faith.
Boundary mistakes, an inevitable part of the American property system,
necessitate the doctrine. That is why it would be wasteful, if not
counterproductive, for the doctrine to insist that a possessor positively prove
her good-faith mistake in each and every case. The lack of such a
requirement—the fact that in most states the hostility requirement does not
translate into a requirement of good faith on the intruder’s part—has often
been presented as the most objectionable, or unfair, element of adverse

309.
310.
311.
312.

See SINGER, supra note 21, at 169–72.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
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possession.313 Once the doctrine’s actual role—solving inevitable boundary
mistakes the system has opted to live with—is clarified, the counterintuitive
nature of the hostility requirement is easier to accept.
2. Notoriety
This Article’s account also aids in elucidating the logic of the other adverse
possession requirement whose application is often held up as unfair:
notoriety. A successful adverse possession claim requires that the claimant’s
possession be “open and notorious,” meaning that it puts the owner on
notice.314 This requirement does not entail proof that the owner actually
knew about the intrusion but merely that she could have known.315
Therefore, an innocent owner, who was never aware that another person was
on her land and thus never had the opportunity to act to remove the trespasser,
could lose her land.316 The same occurs with an owner who never knew that
the intruded land was hers to begin with.317
This result is troubling because adverse possession has traditionally been
understood as a tool for penalizing owners who sleep on their rights. The
title owner should lose her land, those explanations hold, because she opted
to not pay attention to her land, thereby allowing another to become attached
to it, underutilizing the land, or disquieting title.318 But if the owner did not
actually know that her land was being intruded, she cannot that easily be said
to have allowed these consequences; if she did not know the land was hers,
she cannot even be said to have opted to not pay attention. That she should
still be held responsible for those detrimental social consequences (another’s
reliance, underuse of land, or unquiet title) that the existing theories of
adverse possession stress, with the attendant penalty of losing her land, is
normatively unappealing.319
Equipped with this Article’s new understanding of adverse possession’s
function, this startling result the doctrine can produce is much less troubling
or even surprising. Adverse possession is not set up to penalize the owner.
Thus, just as the intruder’s mental state is irrelevant for the doctrine’s
hostility element, so is the owner’s for the notoriety element.320 Adverse
possession is geared toward settling boundary disputes, whose presence and
means of resolution have little to do with an owner actually knowing what
she owns or where her neighbor’s land is located. In fact, the doctrine is
313. See generally R. H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH.
U. L.Q. 331 (1983).
314. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 87.08.
315. Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Alaska 1977) (“The owner need
not actually know about the presence of an adverse possessor . . . .”).
316. 16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.04 (2019).
317. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Town of Concord, 788 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Mass. 2003).
318. See supra notes 84–85, 106 and accompanying text.
319. For this reason, some courts add an acquiescence requirement, interpreted as actual
knowledge, for prescriptive easement claims. See SINGER, supra note 21, at 203–04.
320. See, e.g., Doyle v. Hicks, 897 P.2d 420 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that the
owner’s thought process is irrelevant).
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premised on the assumption that many times boundaries are, in a sense,
unknowable in the American landscape: deeds conflict, old deeds have
outdated descriptions, and so on.321 Due to the way our boundary and land
transfer system is structured, “actual” knowledge of the real boundary is at
times impossible. Insisting that the owner actually know about an
intrusion—through a strict interpretation of the notoriety requirement—
would be irrational.
The unfortunate state of the formal boundary system that adverse
possession addresses, as Part II showed, not only explains this doctrinally
well-established reading of the notoriety requirement. It should also serve to
inform courts as they deal with a subset of cases whose treatment under the
requirement is contested. While doctrine clearly only holds that the owner
should have known of an intrusion—even if she did not actually know—the
question arises whether an owner should have known of an intrusion
undetectable to the naked eye. If the neighbor’s wall, fence, or driveway
trespasses onto the owner’s land to the extent of only a few inches or feet, an
owner will be unable to note it unless she conducts a periodic survey.322 In
such situations, the owner could be viewed as not on notice because she could
not have noted the intrusion by visiting the land. Alternatively, she could be
viewed as on notice because she could have had a survey done noting the
intrusion.323
New Jersey courts are probably the only ones that have explicitly adopted
the former position.324 They insist that “as a matter of law no presumption
of knowledge [arises] from the prior minor and passive encroachments along
the common boundary line.”325 When “the fact of an intrusion is not clearly
and self-evidently apparent to the naked eye but requires an on-site survey
for certain disclosure . . . , such a presumption is fallacious and
unjustified.”326 Some other courts have reached similar conclusions in
individual cases,327 and some may limit the rights gained through
imperceptive intrusions (for example, granting an easement for keeping
intruding awnings but not title for the land below).328 However, the majority
321. See supra notes 217–21 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., McCarty v. Sheets, 423 N.E.2d 297, 298–99 (Ind. 1981) (involving a garage
wall and eaves encroaching one to two feet); Thomas v. Mrkonich, 78 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn.
1956) (involving a stairway encroaching 4.5 inches); De Rosa v. Spaziani, 142 N.Y.S.2d 839,
841 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (“Th[e] encroachment runs at its base from 6 1/2 inches . . . to 8 1/2
inches . . . . [In addition,] the upper portion of the wall leans over . . . an additional 8 1/2
inches beyond the foundation. In addition . . . the plaintiff placed shingles upon said wall,
which . . . extended the existing encroachment by about three-fourths of an inch.”).
323. See, e.g., Reeves v. Metro. Tr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Ark. 1973).
324. NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 6:4 (James Charles Smith ed.), Westlaw (database
updated Nov. 2020).
325. Stump v. Whibco, 715 A.2d 1006, 1010 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
326. Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 263 (N.J. 1969).
327. See, e.g., Morgan v. Jenson, 181 N.W. 89, 91 (N.D. 1921) (holding that a bay
window’s foundation intruding by “a few inches . . . . certainly could not be said to be
sufficient to attract the attention of, or be visible to, the owner of the record title . . .”).
328. McCarty v. Sheets, 423 N.E.2d 297, 301 (Ind. 1981) (holding that a garage’s miniscule
encroachment sufficed for adverse possession, a similar intrusion by the lawn did not, and an
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position is that an imperceptive intrusion does provide notice.329 Courts hold
that because the owner could have had a survey taken through which she
would have noted the intrusion, the owner was on notice.330
In light of this Article’s findings, this position is ill-advised. Because the
presumption underlying adverse possession is that formal boundaries are
sometimes unknowable, the majority approach materializes as incoherent. It
calls on owners to conduct periodic surveys of their land to avoid loss through
adverse possession.331 Yet adverse possession’s justification is that the
American land system generally assumes that a survey is of little help in
determining boundaries. As noted, at times, the formal lines cannot be
identified through a survey. An old deed might rely on unscientific markers,
deeds to neighboring lots could cover the same area, different deeds for the
same lot could contain different descriptions.332 In fact, our legal system
does not ask the owner to survey her land even when she acquires it: she is
expected to rely on reality as she sees it and on insurance.333 Thus, requiring
an owner to make periodic surveys of her land to verify that a neighbor is not
intruding is inconsistent with the system’s structure.334 Intrusions into land
that are undetectable to the naked eye should not count as putting the
landowner on notice.
3. Color of Title
Aside from helping to understand and interpret adverse possession’s
hostility and notoriety requirements, this Article’s new reading of the
doctrine’s role aids in grasping a specific category of cases for which adverse
possession has developed a special rule seemingly undermining its normal
requirements: “color of title.” In most jurisdictions an adverse possession
claim is strengthened if it is made under color of title. Possession is under
color of title when it is based on a written instrument that while not truly

intruding awning only generated a prescriptive easement); Greene v. Jones, 490 N.E.2d 776,
778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding plowing, grading, and planting grass on a seven-foot strip
was not conspicuous enough to suffice for a successful adverse possession claim).
329. Scoville v. Burns, 207 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948) (finding notorious a wall
and steps encroaching by eleven inches); Shinors v. Joslin, 180 P. 574, 574 (Mont. 1919)
(finding notorious “a triangular strip 4 1/2 inches wide at the base, and 18.7 feet in length,
extending along the boundary line to its apex, over which the roof of defendant’s residence
projects; and . . . a strip 8 inches wide at one end, 2 inches wide at the other, and 67 feet
long . . . by . . . [a] fence and coalshed”); Lewis v. Idones, 116 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383–84 (App.
Div. 1952) (finding notorious a wall encroaching by 6.5 inches to 9.5 inches).
330. Five Twelve Locust, Inc. v. Mednikow, 270 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1954) (explaining
that since a survey could have detected the one-eighth-inch ground level intrusion, “the
important and controlling fact” was that the building’s “width and height were, of course,
openly visible”).
331. Mannillo, 255 A.2d at 264.
332. See supra notes 37–38, 217–21.
333. See supra Part II.C.
334. Mannillo, 255 A.2d at 264 (noting that requiring the “true owner” to “obtain[] a survey
each time the adjacent owner undertook any improvement at or near the boundary . . . would
place an undue and inequitable burden upon the true owner”).
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conveying title, amounts to “an appearance of title.”335 Color of title,
therefore, is normally established through a defective deed336: a deed
missing a signature,337 a deed from only one among multiple owners,338 a
deed granted by someone not actually the owner,339 an invalid tax deed,340
or a deed from a foreclosure sale voidable because of irregularities.341 In
such cases the instrument purports and appears to grant title, but it fails to do
so due to the legal defect.342 The grantee thus is not, and cannot be, awarded
formal title through the document. Still, that defective document might help
her gain the land through adverse possession thanks to the color of title
doctrine.
Armed with a defective document that supplies color of title, an adverse
possession claimant need not prove the one element of the claim that is often
the most challenging: actual possession of the whole land. She need only
prove “constructive possession.”343 With color of title, the claimant must
only actually occupy one part of the tract covered by the defective document
to be regarded as in possession of the whole tract.344 This represents a major
exception to the normal rule applicable to adverse possession claims,
whereby the awarded interest’s contours are wholly based on realities on the
ground.345
Color of title’s treatment also materializes as an exception to a successful
adverse possession claim’s other core requirement: hostility. Because in a
color of title scenario, the title owner at some point purported to transfer title
to the possessor (through the faulty deed), how could she be said to have not
permitted the possessor’s entry?346 The person entering land, relying on a
deed, even if faulty, explicitly received permission. Still, almost all courts
find that possession under color of title is hostile.347 Their explanations for
this seeming contradiction are so overly technical that they become
incoherent.348 Commentators note that the rule should be viewed not in light
of any internal logic but rather through its “practical utility” in enabling
335. 16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 316, § 91.08.
336. A void court decree suffices, too. See Meinders v. Bd. of Educ., 344 P.2d 572, 573
(Okla. 1959).
337. Romero v. Garcia, 546 P.2d 66, 67 (N.M. 1976).
338. Wallace v. McPherson, 214 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tenn. 1947).
339. Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 466 P.2d 815, 816, 818–19 (Alaska 1970).
340. Green v. Dixon, 727 So. 2d 781, 783 (Ala. 1998).
341. Buckner v. Sewell, 225 S.W.2d 525, 531 (Ark. 1949).
342. Knight v. Boner, 459 P.2d 205, 207–08 (Wyo. 1969).
343. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 87.07.
344. See Roe v. Doe ex rel. Tenn. Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 50 So. 230, 231 (Ala. 1909).
345. 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY, supra note 203, § 1155 (“As a general rule, one can
acquire by adverse possession the title to so great an extent of land only as is covered by his
acts of actual possession . . . .”).
346. See SINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 299.
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Polanski v. Eagle Point, 141 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Wis. 1966) (“Where it is
admitted that the present possession is the result of a conveyance by a former owner, it is
obvious that there will be no forcible entry. However, the occupation of property pursuant to
a deed is presumptively and in fact an act adverse to and in derogation of the former owner’s
title.”).
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adverse possession claims in color of title cases.349 They thereby perceive
the special rule for color of title claims as impossible to square with adverse
possession’s normal hostility requirement. The law’s promotion of claims
under color of title thus flies in the face of adverse possession’s two key
requirements: that a claimant possess the contested land and do so adversely.
This perceived conflict between color of title and adverse possession’s
basic principles disappears once adverse possession’s function is illuminated.
The doctrine, as we saw, is meant to replace the central clearinghouse for
land transfers—a registry—that American states have forgone. Elsewhere in
the world, the central registry dictates and enforces a uniform system for
transfers. That system assures transfers’ standardization and reliability. Part
II.C showed that in the United States, adverse possession treats one infirmity
the lack of such enforced uniformity generates: the unreliable boundaries
deeds may establish.350 But the harms generated by the absence of a central
registry assuring that all transfers abide by clear rules are not limited to faulty
boundaries. With no central policing agency, other potential defects in
documents transferring land are fated: missing signatures, unfollowed
procedures, etc.
Just as the typical application of the adverse possession doctrine treats the
problem of defective boundaries in deeds, the color of title rule aims to
address these other defects.351 The color of title doctrine actually requires
for its application that boundaries in the defective deed be clear.352 The color
of title doctrine thereby specifically targets other, non-boundary-related
cases where our transfer system fails: mainly those where technical mistakes
cloud an apparent owner’s right to convey the land.
Because the color of title rule does not specifically tackle the problem of
faulty boundaries but rather tackles other problems our flawed transfer
system generates, it need not rely on the tools for ascertaining boundaries
employed in the normal adverse possession case—which, as noted, is all
about faulty boundaries. Namely, it need not resort to the reality on the
ground (actual possession) and insist on the existence of a real dispute
(hostility). While these elements can provide guidance for settling boundary
disputes that the imperfections of the deed recording system creates, they are
irrelevant for other disputes to which those imperfections give rise. For
treating disputes pertaining to nonboundary defects in deeds that are the
charge of the color of title rule, no need exists to resort to these tests.
Thus, despite the fact that its specific doctrinal requirements appear
misaligned with those of the typical adverse possession claim (namely, its
wholesale relaxation of the possession and hostility requirements), color of
title’s animating logic and the function it performs are part and parcel of the
overall doctrine. Like regular claims of adverse possession, color of title
349. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 181 (2021).
350. See supra Part II.C.
351. Gloyd v. Franck, 154 S.W. 744, 746 (Mo. 1912) (“Ordinarily color of title does not
apply in boundary disputes.”).
352. 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY, supra note 203, § 1155.
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claims fix problems in our registry-less land transfer system. They just treat
a factually different type of problem and thus employ different tests.
B. Regulating Title Insurance Companies
The normative need a doctrine answers must inform the manner in which
it is applied—and hence the preceding section suggested explanations for,
and adjustments to, judicial interpretations of adverse possession’s
elements.353 But because the specific need the doctrine of adverse possession
answers, as identified in Part II, is generated and maintained by a specific
market actor, the findings should also affect that actor’s regulation. Adverse
possession serves as a public subsidy to the title insurance industry, and thus,
grounds could be found for governmental regulation of that industry. This
section will sketch the framework for such regulation. It will explain why
the title insurance industry should be viewed as a public utility and which
elements of public utilities’ regulatory framework should be imported to the
regulation of this specific industry. It will also review existing examples of
state regulation of title insurance.
The grounds for regulating the title insurance industry lie in the
characteristics of its business model that render it a vital monopoly. Title
insurance is the backbone of the American system for land transactions.
States have opted to forgo a public system for land transactions, instituting
instead a system that is in essence private.354 This private option heavily
relies on (arguably, necessitates) the title insurance product. Furthermore, in
practice, even if an individual buyer were willing to transact without
insurance, she could not, because lenders require insurance.355 Title
insurance companies thus provide a service on which all those transacting in
land depend. As a treatise concludes, “the title insurance company’s office
frequently is the nucleus for the entire real property transaction.”356
The number of such service providers that can exist is limited. To provide
the service, a title insurance company compiles its own version of the public
records, called a “title plant,” which efficiently organizes information about
all lands in the state.357 The resultant plants are vast and highly accurate title
databases, which often surpass in completeness and quality the governmental
records.358 Once created, these are cheap to maintain and produce a very
high return: each consecutive policy issued requires no additional research
beyond that done for the earlier sale of the lot, and yet for each sale the new
buyer pays a full premium.359 Theoretically, if the same lot is sold daily, full
payment can be charged to each daily buyer, although no additional work—

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Parts II.B–C.
Melynda Dovel Wilcox, Home Buyers Beware, KIPLINGER’S, Oct. 2001, at 97.
1 TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 1:3 (Joyce Palomar ed., 2020).
McCaffree Fin. Corp. v. Nunnink, 847 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 335, § 83.01.
Barnet, supra note 250, at 13–14.
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beyond the original research of the lot that went into the firm’s database—is
necessary.360
Contrast this profitable standing of an existing title firm to a new one’s
predicament. A new entrant into the title insurance market would be hard
pressed to create its own plant: before issuing one policy, it will have to
spend enormous resources investigating each lot. Consequently, it will have
to charge potential buyers high premiums, while the existing firms can lower
their fees (because they now need to invest very little in research preceding
the policy’s issuance). The barriers confronting new entrants to the title
insurance market are, therefore, very high.361
The result is that the market is highly concentrated in a few firms. Four
large players accounted for 87.7 percent of total industry revenue in 2018.362
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has in the past charged these
companies for price-fixing.363 Even after that complaint, the companies have
not been competing on price.364 Explaining, at another time, its objection to
an industry merger, the FTC observed, “[t]here are no commercially
reasonable substitutes for title plant services.”365 The Iowa Supreme Court
also noted, in a different context, the “oligopolistic nature of the industry.”366
Furthermore, it is unclear whether breaking up the title insurance oligopoly
would be socially beneficial. The creation of multiple title plants all covering
the same land is wasteful. Each must contain full and identical information
(otherwise it will be useless to buyers) and thus any new insurance company
will spend funds on duplicating work already done.367 As is the case with
other infrastructures—for example, the transportation infrastructure of
railroads or the power infrastructure of electricity providers—having only
one underlying infrastructure describing land boundaries is desirable. The
title insurance plant is what is often referred to as a natural monopoly.368
The two traits of title insurance just reviewed—an industry vital for the
public interest with the characteristics of a monopoly, perhaps a natural
monopoly—render it analogous to the traditional industries American law

360. Bostick, supra note 188, at 72.
361. See, e.g., IBISWORLD, US SPECIALIZED INDUSTRY REPORTS: TITLE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY IN THE US—MARKET RESEARCH REPORT (2020), https://www.ibisworld.com/united
-states/market-research-reports/title-insurance-industry [https://perma.cc/JJ82-U5GG].
362. Id.
363. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 625 (1992).
364. See Wilcox, supra note 355.
365. Complaint at 6, 9, In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., 125 F.T.C. 906 (1998) (No. C3808).
366. Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Huff, 256 N.W.2d 17, 29 (Iowa 1977).
367. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URB. AFFS., 92D CONG., REP. ON
MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT COSTS 29–30 (Comm. Print 1972) (arguing that excessive
duplication of property records occurred between title companies leading to higher closing
costs on homes).
368. See Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility
Industry: An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REGUL. 63, 67 (1993) (“A natural monopoly exists
when a single firm can produce a desired level of output at lower total cost than any output
combination of more than one firm.”).
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views as “public utilities.”369 Perhaps counterintuitively, title insurance is
much more similar to electricity and telecom—and the original utility,
railroads—than to other insurance products.370 The reflexive move to treat
title insurance as the law treats other insurance services is misguided: unlike
the latter, the title insurance industry’s key characteristic is not its assumption
of risk.371 A fire or car insurance company, when issuing a policy to an
individual, cannot do research to verify that the house will never burn or the
car will never have an accident. The company takes on that risk. Conversely,
the title insurance policy is only issued after the company has researched the
land and verified the absence of any risk of mistake.372 The company takes
on very little, if any, risk (accordingly the policy, unlike normal insurance
policies, is not priced to reflect the risk of payout—but as a fixed percentage
of the purchase price). Perhaps consequently, the title insurance industry has
to contend with very few claims for losses.373 The Iowa court noted evidence
indicating an industry loss ratio of 0 percent.374 Accordingly, the focus of
the industry’s public regulation, unlike the public regulation of other
insurance industries, need not be verifying that title insurance does not
assume unsustainable risks thereby threatening insurers’ solvency (and the
attendant ability to pay out claims).375 Rather, the focus must be on title
insurance’s function as an indispensable market infrastructure, as in the case
of the typical public utility.
Public utilities, traditionally, are regulated to assure that they provide the
same quality service to all market actors.376 The state dictates the service’s
quality and mandates that the utility serve identically all potential clients. For
title insurance companies, this would mean policing the risks a policy
protects buyers against.377 It could also entail barring the company from
discriminating between buyers. For example, the company could be
prohibited from providing better services to buyers who commit to work with
a certain bank (whose financial interest the insurance company otherwise
wishes to promote).378
369. See, e.g., Jim Rossi & Morgan Ricks, Foreword to Revisiting the Public Utility, 35
YALE J. ON REGUL. 711, 711–12 (2018).
370. See Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35
YALE J. ON REGUL. 941, 989 (2018) (arguing that title insurance is the only insurance product
that could be regulated as a public utility).
371. Szypszak, supra note 294, at 688–89 (arguing that title insurance is more risk
prevention than risk assumption).
372. Title insurance companies are often legally prohibited from issuing policies without
conducting a title search. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 381.071 (2021).
373. While home and car insurance companies pay upwards of 80 percent of premium
dollars on claims, title insurers only pay around 3 or 4 percent. Andrews, supra note 283.
374. Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Huff, 256 N.W.2d 17, 27 (Iowa 1977).
375. See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF
INSURANCE 49–70 (1988) (explaining the goals of insurance regulation).
376. Schwarcz, supra note 370, at 943.
377. For why such policing is needed, see Bostick, supra note 188, at 72 (arguing that
companies’ practice of exceptions “leads to substantial difficulties because the exceptions in
policies often relate to those problems most likely to be encountered”).
378. Wilcox, supra note 355.

2690

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Beyond service provision regulation, an even more intrusive element of
traditional public utility regulation is rate setting.379 A utility, for example a
power company, provides a vital service and lacks true competition, so the
free market would allow it to charge almost any price. Because exorbitant
pricing could debilitate other economic activities relying on the utility, the
state limits the utility’s prices to a reasonable return.380 If title insurance is
treated like a utility, a state entity should set title insurance’s policy rates.
A handful of examples for title insurance companies’ regulation along the
suggested lines can already be found. Some aspects of the service provision
are at times regulated. In almost all states, companies are subject to reporting
obligations.381 A majority of states review the quality of at least some of the
processes preceding a title insurance policy’s issuance (for example, the title
search).382 A small number of states limit title insurance companies’ power
to affiliate with mortgage companies, since these often refer a home buyer to
a title insurance company.383 Price regulation is rarer still. In most states,
title insurance companies must report the rates they charge, and seventeen
states subject rates to approval.384 However, the typical approval standard is
rather lax, focusing mostly on assuring that rates are not discriminatory.385
Only Florida,386 New Mexico,387 and Texas388 empower public bodies to
promulgate title insurance rates.
The most radical measure for state control of the title insurance industry is
adhered to in Iowa. Since 1947, Iowa law has prohibited title insurance.389
Instead, a state entity has been established that issues a title guarantee policy
offering land buyers the same coverage as private title insurance.390 This
public replacement of the private industry functions extremely well. The
premiums the state charges for the guarantee are a fraction of the premiums
private title insurance charges elsewhere,391 and Iowa’s title system is
considered the country’s most accurate.392
This Article’s findings should serve to press a greater number of states to
adopt the more active forms of title insurance regulation reviewed here. As
established in Part II, the general public subsidizes title insurance companies,
379. See Rossi, supra note 369, at 717.
380. See Schwarcz, supra note 370, at 950–51.
381. NAT’L ASS’N OF TITLE INS. COMM’RS TITLE INS. (C) TASK FORCE, SURVEY OF STATE
INSURANCE LAWS REGARDING TITLE DATA AND TITLE MATTERS 2 (2015).
382. See id. at 8–9.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 12.
385. Id. at 13. The standard formula bars “inadequate or unfairly discriminatory . . . [or]
excessive” rates. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 910-39(b) (2021). The resulting regulation
is so permissive that companies charge less than allowed. See generally Goldmacher, supra
note 282.
386. FLA. STAT. § 627.782 (2021).
387. N.M. CODE R. § 13.14.9.18 (LexisNexis 2021).
388. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2703.151 (West 2021).
389. IOWA CODE § 515.48(10) (2021).
390. See id. § 16.4C.
391. Goldmacher, supra note 282.
392. Wilcox, supra note 355, at 98.
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not only through the premiums it must pay but also through its subjugation
to a suboptimal boundary management system with the attendant costs of
adverse possession. Iowa’s choice to replace the private industry with a
public service is wholly justified. A service sustained through legal doctrines
alone should not generate limitless fruits for a parasitic private industry.393
Other states might find the Iowa route of abolishing private power in the field
too radical, but they should at least consider controlling such power’s
expansion. The recording system that necessitates the doctrine of adverse
possession aids title insurance companies in maintaining their stranglehold
on the market for managing land transactions.394 They should not be allowed
to leverage this public subsidy to further strengthen their position in adjacent
markets, such as the mortgages market. Limits on title insurance companies’
affiliation with mortgage companies and other actors in the real estate market
are thus clearly called for. Perhaps more urgently than any such structural
reform, all states should proceed to follow the three that set title insurance
rates. Arguments that reject rate regulation in this case are incoherent once
we see the industry as a natural monopoly—one on which citizens must rely
because of the absence of effective state laws for boundary determination.395
One could argue, given this Article’s findings respecting adverse
possession, that no form of title insurance industry regulation would be farreaching enough. Reform must be more drastic. Already, some have argued
that the true regulatory solution for our wasteful system of land management
is switching to the Torrens system.396 However, such sweeping reform is
highly improbable.397 Consequently, as a second-best solution, states should
more effectively regulate the private industry replacing the registration
system.

393. Another reason owes to adverse possession’s effects on title insurance’s costs. The
doctrine helps keep those costs down because it fixes old title defects. In its absence, there
would be more defects, and coverage would be costlier. Thus, one author argues that thanks
to adverse possession, insurance premiums are kept lower. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1129.
However, as private monopolies, insurance companies have been able to maintain prices
unconnected to costs. Hence, any reduction in insurance costs that adverse possession
generates have probably not been passed on to the public.
394. An important target for regulation should be the relationship between insurers and
intermediaries—agents and lenders—that steer clients to the insurance companies. Insurers
woo intermediaries through perks, such as event tickets or gifts. These practices force the
public, which pays for these perks through higher insurance premiums, to fund not only the
insurers but also those intermediaries. See Goldmacher, supra note 282.
395. The argument made against price regulation of title insurance has been that the state
thereby impedes competitive behavior. See Owen R. Phillips & Henry N. Butler, The Law and
Economics of Residential Real Estate Markets in Texas: Regulation and Antitrust
Implications, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 652 (1984). Because the title insurance market is
inherently monopolistic, that claim is peculiar.
396. See supra note 274.
397. 3 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES, supra note 207, § 690 (“So, if, in theory and
in practice outside of the United States, the Torrens system is more efficient than the recording
system, is there a future for the Torrens system in the United States? . . . [T]he answer is that,
unless the law changes dramatically, it is unlikely that more states will adopt a Torrens
system . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION
Most observers—whether lawyers, scholars, law students, or laypeople—
consider adverse possession an anomaly and for good reason. As all realize,
the doctrine contradicts both common intuitions of justice and core property
law premises. Writers have been able to provide some justification for this
anomaly, explaining in different ways why adverse possession is actually an
inevitable product of property law theories and thus serves core legal
principles. This Article questions that move. It shows that as an exception
to the prevailing property regime, adverse possession is not truly in line with
property law theories—and thus, as an anomaly, it is perhaps even more
troubling than assumed before. The theories animating property law do not
need adverse possession; the ineffective American system for managing
boundaries, and the industry benefiting from its dysfunction, do. Economic
interests, not philosophical principles, have constructed a land management
system in the United States that necessitates the doctrine. We should
understand, apply, and interpret adverse possession as such: a practical tool
our imperfect land system needs as long as we insist, probably against our
own best interests, on keeping that system imperfect.

